by the laws of society.  But suppose the same parties to go together to a savage wilderness, or a desert island, beyond the reach of the laws of any society.  The obligation of the contract still subsists, and is as perfect as ever, and is now to be enforced by another law, that is, the law of nature; and the party to whom the promise was made has a right to take by force the animal, the utensil, or the weapon that was promised him.  The right is as perfect here as it was in Pennsylvania, or even in New York; but this could not be so if the obligation were created by the law of New York, or were dependent on that law for its existence, because the laws of that State can have no operation beyond its territory.  Let us reverse this example.  Suppose a contract to be made between two persons cast ashore on an uninhabited territory, or in a place over which no law of society extends.  There are such places, and contracts have been made by individuals casually there, and these contracts have been enforced in courts of law in civilized communities.  Whence do such contracts derive their obligation, if not from universal law?

If these considerations show us that the obligation of a lawful contract does not derive its force from the particular law of the place where made, but may exist where that law does not exist, and be enforced where that law has no validity, then it follows, we contend, that any statute which diminishes or lessens its obligation does impair it, whether it precedes or succeeds the contract in date.  The contract having an independent origin, whenever the law comes to exist together with it, and interferes with it, it lessens, we say, and impairs, its own original and independent obligation.  In the case before the court, the contract did not owe its existence to the particular law of New York; it did not depend on that law, but could be enforced without the territory of that State, as well as within it.  Nevertheless, though legal, though thus independently existing, though thus binding the party everywhere, and capable of being enforced everywhere, yet the statute of New York says that it shall be discharged without payment.  This, we say, impairs the obligation of that contract.  It is admitted to have been legal in its inception, legal in its full extent, and capable of being enforced by other tribunals according to its terms.  An act, then, purporting to discharge it without payment, is, as we contend, an act impairing its obligation.

Here, however, we meet the opposite argument, stated on different occasions in different terms, but usually summed up in this, that the law itself is a part of the contract, and therefore cannot impair it.  What does this mean?  Let us seek for clear ideas.  It does not mean that the law gives any particular construction to the terms of the contract, or that it makes the promise, or the consideration, or the time of performance, other than is expressed in the instrument itself.  It can only mean, that it is to be taken as a part of the contract, or understanding of the parties, that the contract itself shall be enforced by such laws and regulations, respecting remedy and for the enforcement of contracts, as are in being in the State where it is made at the time of entering into it.  This is meant, or nothing very clearly intelligible is meant, by saying the law is part of the contract.