The court below seems to me, with great deference, to have mistaken the object and nature of the license.  It seems to have been of opinion, that the license has no other intent or effect than to ascertain the ownership and character of the vessel.  But this is the peculiar office and object of the enrolment.  That document ascertains that the regular proof of ownership and character has been given; and the license is given to confer the right to which the party has shown himself entitled.  It is the authority which the master carries with him, to prove his right to navigate freely the waters of the United States, and to carry on the coasting trade.

In some of the discussions which have been had on this question, it has been said, that Congress has only provided for ascertaining the ownership and property of vessels, but has not prescribed to what use they may be applied.  But this is an obvious error.  The whole object of the act regulating the coasting trade is to declare what vessels shall enjoy the benefit of being employed in that trade.  To secure this use to certain vessels, and to deny it to others, is precisely the purpose for which the act was passed.  The error, or what I humbly suppose to be the error, in the judgment of the court below, consists in that court’s having thought, that, although Congress might act, it had not yet acted, in such a way as to confer a right on the appellant; whereas, if a right was not given by this law, it never could be given.  No law can be more express.  It has been admitted, that, supposing there is a provision in the act of Congress, that all vessels duly licensed shall be at liberty to navigate, for the purpose of trade and commerce, all the navigable harbors, bays, rivers, and lakes within the several States, any law of the States creating particular privileges as to any particular class of vessels to the contrary notwithstanding, the only question that could arise, in such a case, would be, whether the law was constitutional; and that, if that was to be granted or decided, it would certainly, in all courts and places, overrule and set aside the State grant.

Now, I do not see that such supposed case could be distinguished from the present.  We show a provision in an act of Congress, that all vessels, duly licensed, may carry on the coasting trade; nobody doubts the constitutional validity of that law; and we show that this vessel was duly licensed according to its provisions.  This is all that is essential in the case supposed.  The presence or absence of a non obstante clause cannot affect the extent or operation of the act of Congress.  Congress has no power of revoking State laws, as a distinct power.  It legislates over subjects; and over those subjects which are within its power, its legislation is supreme, and necessarily overrules all inconsistent or repugnant State legislation.  If Congress were to pass an act expressly revoking or annulling, in whole or in part, this New York grant,