But I contend, in the second place, that whether the grant were to be regarded as wholly void or not, it must, at least, be inoperative, when the rights claimed under it come in collision with other rights, enjoyed and secured under the laws of the United States; and such collision, I maintain, clearly exists in this case.  It will not be denied that the law of Congress is paramount.  The Constitution has expressly provided for that.  So that the only question in this part of the case is, whether the two rights be inconsistent with each other.  The appellant has a right to go from New Jersey to New York, in a vessel owned by himself, of the proper legal description, and enrolled and licensed according to law.  This right belongs to him as a citizen of the United States.  It is derived under the laws of the United States, and no act of the legislature of New York can deprive him of it, any more than such act could deprive him of the right of holding lands in that State, or of suing in its courts.  It appears from the record, that the boat in question was regularly enrolled at Perth Amboy, and properly licensed for carrying on the coasting trade.  Under this enrolment, and with this license, she was proceeding to New York, when she was stopped by the injunction of the Chancellor, on the application of the New York grantees.  There can be no doubt that here is a collision, in fact; that which the appellant claimed as a right, the respondent resisted; and there remains nothing now but to determine whether the appellant had, as he contends, a right to navigate these waters; because, if he had such right, it must prevail.

Now, this right is expressly conferred by the laws of the United States.  The first section of the act of February, 1793, ch. 8, regulating the coasting trade and fisheries, declares, that all ships and vessels, enrolled and licensed as that act provides, “and no others, shall be deemed ships or vessels of the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries.”  The fourth section of the same act declares, “that, in order to the licensing of any ship or vessel, for carrying on the coasting trade or fisheries,” bond shall be given, according to the provisions of the act.  And the same section declares, that, the owner having complied with the requisites of the law, “it shall be the duty of the collector to grant a license for carrying on the coasting trade”; and the act proceeds to give the form and words of the license, which is, therefore, of course, to be received as a part of the act; and the words of the license, after the necessary recitals, are, “License is hereby granted for the said vessel to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade.”  Words could not make this authority more express.