are summoned to resistance, there is no reason to believe that such resistance would be less forcible, or less successful, because the number of such proprietors happened to be great.  Each would perceive his own importance, and his own interest, and would feel that natural elevation of character which the consciousness of property inspires.  A common sentiment would unite all, and numbers would not only add strength, but excite enthusiasm.  It is true, that France possesses a vast military force, under the direction of an hereditary executive government; and military power, it is possible, may overthrow any government.  It is in vain, however, in this period of the world, to look for security against military power to the arm of the great landholders.  That notion is derived from a state of things long since past; a state in which a feudal baron, with his retainers, might stand against the sovereign and his retainers, himself but the greatest baron.  But at present, what could the richest landholder do, against one regiment of disciplined troops?  Other securities, therefore, against the prevalence of military power must be provided.  Happily for us, we are not so situated as that any purpose of national defence requires, ordinarily and constantly, such a military force as might seriously endanger our liberties.

In respect, however, to the recent law of succession in France, to which I have alluded, I would, presumptuously perhaps, hazard a conjecture, that, if the government do not change the law, the law in half a century will change the government; and that this change will be, not in favor of the power of the crown, as some European writers have supposed, but against it.  Those writers only reason upon what they think correct general principles, in relation to this subject.  They acknowledge a want of experience.  Here we have had that experience; and we know that a multitude of small proprietors, acting with intelligence, and that enthusiasm which a common cause inspires, constitute not only a formidable, but an invincible power.[14]

The true principle of a free and popular government would seem to be, so to construct it as to give to all, or at least to a very great majority, an interest in its preservation; to found it, as other things are founded, on men’s interest.  The stability of government demands that those who desire its continuance should be more powerful than those who desire its dissolution.  This power, of course, is not always to be measured by mere numbers.  Education, wealth, talents, are all parts and elements of the general aggregate of power; but numbers, nevertheless, constitute ordinarily the most important consideration, unless, indeed, there be a military force in the hands of the few, by which they can control the many.  In this country we have actually existing systems of government, in the maintenance of which, it should seem, a great majority, both in numbers and in other means of power and influence, must see their interest.