note to France and Austria stating that the employment of Austrian or French forces to repress the clearly expressed will of the people of Central Italy “would not be justifiable towards the government of the Queen.”  Lord Palmerston made the remark that the French formula of “Italy given to herself” had been transformed into “Italy sold to Austria.”  He grew every day more distrustful of Napoleon, and more regretful that the only man whom he believed able to cope with him was out of office.

“They talk a great deal in Paris of Cavour’s intrigues,” he wrote to Lord Cowley.  “This seems to me unjust.  If they mean that he has worked for the aggrandisement and for the emancipation of Italy from foreign yoke and Austrian domination, this is true, and he will be called a patriot in history.  The means he has employed may be good or bad.  I do not know what they have been; but the object in view is, I am sure, the good of Italy.  The people of the Duchies have as much right to change their sovereigns as the English people, or the French, or the Belgian, or the Swedish.  The annexation of the Duchies to Piedmont will be an unfathomable good for Italy at the same time as for France and for Europe.  I hope Walewski will not urge the Emperor to make the slavery of Italy the denoument of a drama which had for its first scene the declaration that Italy should be free from Alps to Adriatic.  If the Italians are left to themselves all will go well; and when they say that if the French garrison were recalled from Rome all the priests would be assassinated, one can cite the case of Bologna, where the priests have not been molested and where perfect order is maintained.”  However much Austria might dislike the turn which events had taken in the Centre, it was generally admitted that she would not or could not intervene, even single-handed, without the tacit consent of France, which had still five divisions in Lombardy.  The issue, therefore, hung on France.  There is no doubt that Napoleon told all the Italians, or presumably Italian sympathisers who came near him, that he “would not allow” the union of Tuscany with Piedmont.  He said to Lord Cowley, “The annexation of Tuscany is a real impossibility.”  He told the Marquis Pepoli that if the annexations crossed the Apennines, unity would be achieved; and he did not want unity:  he wanted only independence.  Walewski echoed these sentiments, and in his case it is certain that he meant what he said.  But did Napoleon mean what he said?  Evidence has come to light that all this time he was speaking in an entirely different key whenever his visitor was a reactionist or a clerical.  To these he invariably said that he was obliged to let events take their course, though contrary to his interests; because, having given the blood of his soldiers for Italian independence, he could not fire a shot against it.  To M. de Falloux he said that he had always been bound to the cause of Italy, and it was impossible for him to turn his guns against her.  What becomes, then, of his threats?  Might not an Italian minister, relying on the support of England, have ignored them and passed on his way?