belonged to them!  The Earl of Malmesbury once remarked that “on any question affecting Italy Lord Palmerston had no scruples.”  Had the Conservative statesman continued in office six months longer, in spite of his wish to see Italy happy, the “scruples” of which he spoke would have probably induced him to try and force her back under the Austrian yoke.  Whether Cavour’s life-work was to succeed or fail depended henceforth largely on England.  “Now it is England’s turn,” he said frequently to his relations in Switzerland, where he went to recover his health and spirits.  Soon all traces of depression disappeared.  While Europe thought that it had assisted at his political funeral, he was engaged not in thinking how things might be remedied, but how he was going to remedy them.  It was not the king, Piedmont, Italy, that would prevent the treaty from being carried out; it was “I.”  The road was cut; he would take another.  He would occupy himself with Naples.  People might call him a revolutionist or what they pleased, but they must go on, and they would go on.

There exists proof that after Villafranca, Cavour expected Napoleon to demand Savoy and Nice, or at least Savoy, notwithstanding that Venetia was not freed.  The Emperor considered it necessary, however, to go through the form of renouncing the two provinces.  He is reported to have said to Victor Emmanuel before leaving for Paris, “Your government will pay me the cost of the war, and we shall think no more about Nice and Savoy.  Now we shall see what the Italians can do by themselves.”  Walewski confirmed this by stating that the simple annexation of Lombardy was not a sufficient motive “for demanding a sacrifice on the part of our ally in the interest of the safety of our frontiers,” and in August he formally repeated to Rattazzi that they did not dream of annexing Savoy.  Sincere or not, these disclaimers released Victor Emmanuel from the secret bond into which Cavour had persuaded him to enter.  The contract was recognised as null.  Rattazzi was notoriously opposed to any cession of territory, and had he known how to play his game it is at least open to argument that the House of Savoy might have been spared losing its birthright as the Houses of Orange and Lorraine had lost theirs.  But his weak policy landed Italian affairs in a chaos which made Napoleon once more master of the situation.

The populations of Central Italy desired Victor Emmanuel for their king—­Was he to accept or refuse?  Rattazzi tried to steer between acceptance and refusal.  A great many people thought then that acceptance outright would have brought the armed intervention of France or of Austria, or of both combined.  The sagacious historian ought not lightly to set aside the current conviction of contemporaries.  Those who come after are much better informed as to data, but they fail to catch the atmospheric tendency, the beginning-to-drift, of which witnesses are sensible.  The scare was universal.  The British Government sent a formal