What, if persisted in, would have been the most serious obstacle was the opposition of Rattazzi, but he was won over to assent, if not to approval, by Giuseppe Lanza, a new figure on the parliamentary scene, who had lately been elected Vice-President of the Chamber.  Lanza (who was destined to be Prime Minister when the Italians went to Rome) was then only slightly acquainted with Cavour; from being independent, his favourable opinion carried more weight.  With Rattazzi’s adhesion the majority of the Centres was secured.  It was not an enthusiastic majority, but it quieted its forebodings by the argument which was beginning to take hold of people’s minds:  that Cavour must be let do as he chose.  Hardly any one liked him, but to see him stand there, absolutely unhesitating and sure, among the politicians of Buts and Ifs, began to generate the belief that he was a man of fate who must be allowed to go his way.

It is easy to be wise after the event, and it may seem strange now that the alliance with the Western Powers found so few, so very few cordial supporters.  But Cavour himself called the risks which attended it “enormous.”  The great question for Sardinia was what Austria would do.  If she did nothing, the pros and cons were perhaps evenly balanced; if she joined Russia, the pros would be strengthened; if she joined the allies, the situation for Sardinia would be grave indeed.  The republicans were already calling the war an alliance with Austria.  Were the description verified, it was hard to see how the utmost genius or skill could draw aught but evil from so unnatural a union.

The first invitation to Sardinia to co-operate came separately from England, which had vetoed a monstrous proposal on the part of Austria to occupy Alessandria, in order, in any case, to prevent Piedmont from attacking her during the war.  Lord Clarendon instructed Sir James Hudson to represent to Cavour that Austria’s fears would be set at rest if a portion of the Sardinian army were sent to the East.  The chief English motive was really the conviction that numbers were urgently required if the war was to succeed, and also the desire to lessen the large numerical superiority of the French.  In the first instance Cavour replied that although he had been all along in favour of participating in the war, his Cabinet was too much against the idea for him to take any immediate action.  But the subject was revived.  An alliance with Piedmont was popular in England, where the Government was in an Italian mood, having been made terribly angry by the King of Naples’ prohibition of the sale of mules for transport purposes in the East.  In December 1854 Cavour was formally invited to send a corps which would enter the English service and receive its pay from the British Exchequer.  He would rather have sent it on these terms than not at all, but the scheme met with such unqualified condemnation from La Marmora and General Dadormida, the Foreign Minister, that it was set aside as not becoming to