The Garibaldian epic closed with the battle near the left bank of the Volturno on October 1.  Still Garibaldi showed no disposition to resign the dictatorship, or to abandon the designs on Rome which he had postponed, not renounced.  On his side, Cavour was resolved that a normal government should be established at Naples, and that Garibaldi should not go to Rome, but he was no less resolved that, as far as he could compass it, the giver of two crowns should be generously treated.  Unfortunately Fanti, the virtual head of the royal army, represented the old military prejudice which classed volunteers with banditti.  A violent scene took place between this general and Cavour; Fanti wished that the Garibaldians should be simply sent home with a gratuity, alleging that “the exigencies of the army” were opposed to the recognition of their grades.  Cavour replied that they were not in Spain,—­in Italy the army obeyed.  The ministerial emissaries in the south received instructions (which they did not invariably execute) to spare no pains to act in harmony with the dictator.  Cavour, himself, treated him always as a power and an equal.  He took care that he was the first to whom the secret of the invasion of the Marches was confided.  He assured him that in case of a war with Austria he would be called upon to play an important part.  When the king started on the march for Naples, Cavour wrote to him advising that “infinite regard” should be paid to the leader of the Thousand; “Garibaldi,” he added, “has become my most violent enemy, but I desire for the good of Italy, and the honour of your Majesty, that he should retire entirely satisfied.”  To L.C.  Farini, who accompanied the king to Naples, he wrote that the whole of Europe would condemn them if they sacrificed to military pedantry men who had given their blood for Italy.  He would bury himself at Leri for the rest of his life rather than be responsible for an act of such black ingratitude.  In spite of all he could do, however, a certain grudging spirit hung about the conduct of Piedmontese officialdom towards the volunteers and their chief, but great personal offers were made to Garibaldi—­the highest military rank, a castle, a ship, the dowry of a princess for his daughter.  All was refused.  Garibaldi asked for the governorship of the Two Sicilies for a year with unlimited power, and this, in the opinion of every person of weight in Italy, it was impossible to grant.

In reviewing Cavour’s conduct of affairs at this point, it is important to dwell on his unwavering fidelity to constitutional methods.  We know now that he was strongly urged to take an opposite course.  Ricasoli telegraphed to him:  “The master stroke would be to proclaim the dictatorship of the king.”  The Iron Baron told Victor Emmanuel to his face that it was humiliating for him to accept half Italy as the gift even of a hero.  It was no time for scruples; the coup d’etat would be legitimised afterwards by universal suffrage;