mouth and by writing, on the inutility and illusion of excommunications when it is a question of temporalities, which Jesus Christ never destined to His Church, and which she cannot possess without outraging His example and compromising His Gospel.”  Cavour did not seek the learned doctors, because he knew that the religious side of the matter, however vital it seemed to the young Breton noblemen who enlisted under Lamoriciere, left unmoved the Pope’s subjects, who had a mixture of scorn and hatred for the rule of priests, such as was not felt for any government in Italy.  For the rest, familiarity lessens the effect of spiritual fulminations, and even of those not spiritual.  For three months Cavour had sustained the running fire of all except one of the foreign representatives at Turin; as he wrote to the Marquis E. d’Azeglio:  “I have the whole corps diplomatique on my back, Hudson excepted; I let them have their say and I go on.”  He deplored the sad fate of diplomacy, which always took the most interest in bad causes, and was the more favourable to a government the worse it was.[1] If ces messieurs protested or departed, they must; he could not arrest the current.  If he tried, it would carry him away with it, “which would not be a great evil,” but it would carry away the dynasty also.  The Peace of Villafranca had caused the Italians to conceive an irresistible desire for unity—­events were stronger than men, and he should only stop before fleets and armies.

[Footnote 1:  We are reminded of a remark of Prince Bismarck:  “Personne, pas meme le plus malveillant democrate, ne se fait une idee de ce qu’il y a de nullite et de charlatanisme dans cette diplomatie.”]

It appears that this time Cavour would have acted even without the assent of Napoleon; it was, however, evidently of great moment to secure it if possible.  The Emperor was making a tour in the newly acquired province of Savoy when General Cialdini and L.C.  Farini were despatched by Cavour to endeavour to win him over.  The interview, which was held at Chambery, was kept so secret that its precise date is not now known.  Cavour tried, not for the first time, the effect of entire frankness.  He counted on persuading Napoleon that their interests were identical:  the White Reaction and the Red Republic were the enemies of both.  He did not neglect the item that Lamoriciere was disliked at the Tuileries.  With regard to Garibaldi, he represented that since the cession of Nice no one could manage him.  The end of it was that, if Napoleon did not say the words “Faites, mais faites vite,” which rumour attributed to him, he certainly expressed their substance.