in concert with the allies; but they had, now, no share in any of his counsels; he conducted all affairs entirely by his own judgment; and was even seeking an occasion of ingratiating himself personally with Philip, in order that, after the Aetolians had laboured through all hardships and difficulties of the war, the Roman might assume to himself all the merit and all the fruits of a peace.”  Certain it is, that he had treated them with less respect than formerly, but they did not know why they were thus slighted.  They imagined that he was actuated by an expectation of presents from the king, though he was of a spirit incapable of yielding to any such passion of the mind; but he was, with good reason, displeased at the Aetolians, on account of their insatiable greediness for plunder, and of their arrogance in assuming to themselves the honour of the victory—­a claim so ill founded, as to offend the ears of all.  Besides, he foresaw that, if Philip were removed out of the way, and the strength of the kingdom of Macedonia entirely broken, the Aetolians would necessarily be regarded as the masters of Greece.  For these reasons, he intentionally did many things to lessen their importance and reputation in the judgment of the other states.

12.  A truce for fifteen days was granted to the Macedonians, and a conference with the king himself appointed.  Before the day arrived on which this was to be held, the Roman general called a council of the allies, and desired their opinions respecting the terms of peace, proper to be prescribed.  Amynander, king of Athamania, delivered his opinion in a few words; that “the conditions of peace ought to be adjusted in such a manner, as that Greece might have sufficient power, even without the interference of the Romans, to maintain the peace, and also its own liberty.”  The address of the Aetolians was more harsh; for after a few introductory observations on the justice and propriety of the Roman general’s conduct, in communicating his plans of peace to those who had acted with him as allies in the war, they insisted, “that he was utterly mistaken, if he supposed that he could leave the peace with the Romans, or the liberty of Greece, on a permanent footing, unless Philip was either put to death or banished from his kingdom; both which he could easily accomplish, if he chose to pursue his present success.”  Quinctius, in reply, said, that “the Aetolians, in giving such advice, attended not either to the maxims of the Roman policy, or to the consistency of their own conduct.  For, in all the former councils and conferences, wherein the conditions of peace were discussed, they never once urged the pushing of the war to the utter ruin of the Macedonian:  and, as to the Romans, besides that they had, from the earliest periods, observed the maxim of sparing the vanquished, they had lately given a signal proof of their clemency in the peace granted to Hannibal and the Carthaginians.  But, not to insist on the