his daughter had never heard him tell the story of this case, in which, it is said, he put the first strong luster on his fame.  In the picture he is a very David—­“ruddy and of a fair countenance”; a countenance at once gentle and valiant, vigorous and pure.  Lifting this face upon the wrinkled chief-justice and associate judges, he began to set forth the points of law, in an argument which, we are told, “was regarded by those who heard it as one of the happiest forensic efforts ever made before the court.”

He set his reliance mainly upon two points:  one, that, it being obvious and admitted that plaintiff was not entirely of African race, the presumption of law was in favor of liberty and with the plaintiff, and therefore that the whole burden of proof was upon the defendants, Belmonti and Miller; and the other point, that the presumption of freedom in such a case could be rebutted only by proof that she was descended from a slave mother.  These points the young attorney had to maintain as best he could without precedents fortifying them beyond attack; but “Adele versus Beauregard” he insisted firmly established the first point and implied the court’s assent to the second, while as legal doctrines “Wheeler on Slavery” upheld them both.  When he was done Salome’s fate was in the hands of her judges.

Almost a month goes by before their judgment is rendered.  But at length, on the 21st of June, the gathering with which our imagination has become familiar appears for the last time.  The chief-justice is to read the decision from which there can be no appeal.  As the judges take their places one seat is left void; it is by reason of sickness.  Order is called, silence falls, and all eyes are on the chief-justice.

He reads.  To one holding the court’s official copy of judgment in hand, as I do at this moment, following down the lines as the justice’s eyes once followed them, passing from paragraph to paragraph, and turning the leaves as his hand that day turned them, the scene lifts itself before the mind’s eye despite every effort to hold it to the cold letter of the time-stained files of the court.  In a single clear, well-compacted paragraph the court states Salome’s claim and Belmonti’s denial; in another, the warrantor Miller’s denial and defense; and in two lines more, the decision of the lower court.  And now—­

“The first inquiry,” so reads the chief-justice—­“the first inquiry that engages our attention is, What is the color of the plaintiff?”

But this is far from bringing dismay to Salome and her friends.  For hear what follows: 

“Persons of color”—­meaning of mixed blood, not pure negro—­“are presumed to be free....  The burden of proof is upon him who claims the colored person as a slave....  In the highest courts of the State of Virginia ... a person of the complexion of the plaintiff, without evidence of descent from a slave mother, would be released even on habeas corpus....  Not only is there no evidence of her [plaintiff] being descended from a slave mother, or even a mother of the African race, but no witness has ventured a positive opinion that she is of that race.”