[Footnote 15:  Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, 721.]

[Footnote 16:—­Ibid., 720.]

[Footnote 17:—­Ibid., 727.]

charge.  The assistance was eventually asked for and refused, refused upon the ground, familiar in United States history, that it would be impossible to get the Missouri troops to cross the state line.  Of course, Price’s conduct was not without extenuation.  His position was not identical with McCulloch’s.  His force was a state force, McCulloch’s a Confederate, or a national.  Besides, Missouri had yet to be gained, officially, for the Confederacy.  She expected secession states and the Confederacy itself to force the situation for her.  And, furthermore, she was in far greater danger of invasion than was Arkansas.  The Kansans were her implacable and dreaded foes and Arkansas had none like them to fear.

In reality, the seat of all the trouble between McCulloch and Price lay in particularism, a phase of state rights, and, in its last analysis, provincialism.  Now particularism was especially pronounced and especially pernicious in the middle southwest.  Missouri had always more than her share of it.  Her politicians were impregnated by it.  They were interested in their own locality exclusively and seemed quite incapable of taking any broad survey of events that did not immediately affect themselves or their own limited concerns.  In the issue between McCulloch and Price, this was all too apparent.  The politicians complained unceasingly of McCulloch’s neglect of Missouri and, finally, taking their case to headquarters, represented to President Davis that the best interests of the Confederate cause in their state were being glaringly sacrificed by McCulloch’s too literal interpretation of his official instructions, in the strict observance of which he was keeping close to the Indian boundary.

President Davis had personally no great liking for

Price and certainly none for his peculiar method of fighting.  Some people thought him greatly prejudiced[18] against Price and, in the first instance, perhaps, on nothing more substantial than the fact that Price was not a Westpointer.[19] It would be nearer the truth to say that Davis gauged the western situation pretty accurately and knew where the source of trouble lay.  That he did gauge the situation and that accurately is indicated by a suggestion of his, made in early December, for sending out Colonel Henry Heth of Virginia to command the Arkansas and Missouri divisions in combination.[20] Heth had no local attachments in the region and “had not been connected with any of the troops on that line of operations."[21] Unfortunately, for subsequent events his nomination[22] was not confirmed.

Two days later, December 5, 1861, General McCulloch was granted[23] permission to proceed to Richmond, there to explain in person, as he had long wanted to do, all matters in controversy between him and Price.  On the third of January, 1862, the Confederate Congress called[24] for information on the subject, doubtless under pressure of political importunity.  The upshot of it all was, the organization of the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. 2 and the appointment of Earl Van Dorn as major-general to command it.  Whether or no, he was the choice[25] of General A.S.  Johnston, department commander, his appointment bid fair, at the