“In answer to your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honor to state that on the 17th April instructions were issued by this Department to remove the troops stationed at Forts Cobb, Arbuckle, Washita, and Smith, to Fort Leavenworth, leaving it to the discretion of the Commanding Officer to replace them, or not, by Arkansas Volunteers.

“The exigencies of the service will not admit any change in these orders.” [Interior Department Files, Bundle no. 1 (1849-1864) War.]

Secretary Smith wrote to Cameron again on the thirtieth [Interior Department Letter Press Book, vol. iii, 125], enclosing Dole’s letter of the same date [Interior Department, File Box, January 1 to December 1, 1861; Indian Office Report Book, no. 12, 176], but to no purpose.]

[Footnote 136:  Indian Office Report Book, no. 12, 218-219.]

[Footnote 137:  Although his refusal to keep faith with the Indians is not usually cited among the things making for Cameron’s unfitness for the office of Secretary of War, it might well and justifiably be.  No student of history questions to-day that the appointment of Simon Cameron to the portfolio of war, to which Thaddeus Stevens had aspirations [Woodburn, Life of Thaddeus Stevens, 239], was one of the worst administrative mistakes Lincoln ever made.  It was certainly one of the four cabinet appointment errors noted by Weed [Autobiography, 607].]

the poor neglected Indians had been driven to the last desperate straits.  The next month, October, nothing at all having been done in the interval, Dole submitted[138] to Secretary Smith new evidence of a most alarmingly serious state of affairs and asked that the president’s attention be at once elicited.  The apparent result was that about the middle of November, Dole was able to write with confidence—­and he was writing at the request of the president—­that the United States was prepared to maintain itself in its authority over the Indians at all hazards.[139]

Boastful words those were and not to be made good until many precious months had elapsed and many sad regrettable scenes enacted.  In early November occurred the reorganization of the Department of the West which meant the formation of a Department of Kansas separate and distinct from a Department of Missouri, an arrangement that afforded ample opportunity for a closer attention to local exigencies in both states than had heretofore been possible or than, upon trial, was subsequently to be deemed altogether desirable.  It necessarily increased the chances for local patronage and exposed military matters to the grave danger of becoming hopelessly entangled with political.

The need for change of some sort was, however, very evident and the demand for it, insistent.  If the southern Indians were not soon secured, they were bound to menace, not only Kansas, but Colorado[140] and to help materially in blocking the way to Texas, New Mexico,