Indian opposition to Steele in tangible form took two directions, one of which, the advancement of Douglas H. Cooper, has already been frequently referred to.  The other was the advancement of Stand Watie.  During the summer, Stand Watie, as chief of the Confederate Cherokees, had authorized the formation of a Cherokee brigade,[886] the object being, the dislodgment of the Federals from Fort Gibson and their consequent retirement from the Cherokee country.  The brigade had not materialized; but all Stand Watie’s subsequent efforts were directed towards the accomplishment of its patriotic object.  Love of country best explains his whole military endeavor.  The enemy in the Cherokee country he harassed, the enemy elsewhere, he left for others to deal with.  Generally speaking, in consequence, the autumn months of 1863 found Watie hovering around the Arkansas, the Cherokees and their neighbors with him, while Cooper, almost equally particularistic because the Choctaws and Chickasaws were his main support, concerned himself with plans for the recovery of Fort Smith.

[Footnote 884:  (cont.) the enemy.  Was it to be burnt and the owners were they to be indemnified [Steele to Anderson, December 9, 1863, Confederate Records, p. 68]?  Steele peremptorily forbade confiscation of Indian property and discouraged any interference “with the duties of agents, or with the National Council or government of the tribes” [Steele to Captain J.L.  Randolph, enrolling officer, July 7, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, p. 132].]

[Footnote 885:  Crosby to A.S.  Cabell, October 6, 1863, Ibid., no. 267, p. 2.]

[Footnote 886:  Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 1103.]

The fervid patriotism of one leader and the overweening personal ambition of the other divided the Indians, then, into two camps and it was but natural that the idea should soon evolve that Indian interests could be best subserved by the formation of two distinct Indian brigades.  To this idea General Smith, when appealed to, subscribed;[887] but General Steele was dubious about the propriety of putting Stand Watie in charge of one of the brigades.  “He appears to exercise,” said Steele, “no restraint over his men in keeping them together, and his requisitions upon the depots seem to be made with utter disregard of the numbers present or even on his rolls."[888] General Smith conceived it would be possible, by organizing the Indians into their own brigades and satisfying them that way, to draw off the white contingent and make of it a separate brigade, still operating, however, within the Indian country.  To Cooper, the thought of a separate white brigade was most unwelcome.  The Indians could be an effective force only in close conjunction with white troops.  The separation of whites and Indians would inevitably mean, although not at present intended, the isolation of the latter and, perhaps, their ultimate abandonment.

The various proposals and counter-proposals all converged in an opposition to Steele.  His presence in the Indian country seemed to block the advancement of everybody.  Cooper resented his authority over himself and Stand Watie interpreted his waiting policy as due to inertness and ineptitude.  So small a hold did the Federals really have on the Indian country that if Steele would only exert himself it could easily be