watch on their own depots and trains.  Up to date, since his first arrival at Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips had been necessarily on the defensive because of the fewness of his men.  Subsequent to the Cabin Creek affair came a change, incident to events and conditions farther east.  The eleventh of July brought General Blunt, commander of the District of the Frontier, to Fort Gibson.  His coming was a surprise, as has already been casually remarked, but it was most timely.  There was no longer any reason whatsoever why offensive action should not be the main thing on the Federal docket in Indian Territory, as elsewhere.

To protect its own supplies and to recuperate, the strength of the Confederate Indian brigade was directed toward Red River, notwithstanding that Steele had still the hope of dislodging the Federals north of the Arkansas.[802] His difficulties[803] were no less legion than before, but he thought it might be possible to accomplish the end desired by invading Kansas,[804] a plan that seemed very feasible after S.P.  Bankhead assumed command of the Northern Sub-District of Texas.[805] Steele himself had “neither the artillery nor the kind of force necessary to take a place” fortified as was Gibson; but to the westward of the Federal stronghold Bankhead might move.  He might attack Fort Scott, Blunt’s headquarters but greatly weakened now, and possibly also some small posts in southwest Missouri, replenishing his resources from time to time in the fertile and well settled Neosho River Valley.  Again

[Footnote 802:  Steele took umbrage at a published statement of Pike that seemed to doubt this and to intimate that the line of the Arkansas had been definitely abandoned [Steele to Pike, July 13, 1863, Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 925].]

[Footnote 803:  For new aspects of his difficulties, see Steele to Boggs, chief of staff, July 7, 1863, Ibid., 909-911.]

[Footnote 804:—­Ibid., p. 910.]

[Footnote 805:  Steele to Bankhead, July 11, 1863, Ibid., 921-922.]

local selfishness rose to the surface[806] and Bankhead, surmising Steele’s weakness and that he would almost inevitably have to fall back, perhaps vacating Indian Territory altogether, became alarmed for the safety of Texas.[807]

Steele’s recognition and admission of material incapacity for taking Fort Gibson in no wise deterred him from attempting it.  The idea was, that Cooper should encamp at a point within the Creek Nation, fronting Fort Gibson, and that Cabell should join him there with a view to their making a combined attack.[808] As entertained, the idea neglected to give due weight to the fact that Cabell’s men were in no trim for immediate action,[809] notwithstanding that concerted action was the only thing likely to induce success.  Blunt, with