“Who will be in command of the Choctaws when you leave?  Will they be sufficient to picket and scout on the other side of the river far enough to give notice of any advance of the enemy down the river?  I do not wish it to be generally known that Cabell’s forces are under my command, but prefer the enemy should think them a separate command; for this reason I do not send these troops west until there is a necessity for it; in the meantime the other troops can be brought into position, where if we can get sufficient ammunition all can be concentrated.  I cannot direct positively, not having the intimate knowledge of the country, but you should be in a position which would enable you to move either down the Ark.  River or on to the road leading from Boggy Depot to Gibson as circumstances may indicate.  Let me hear from you frequently.”—­STEELE to Cooper, April 28, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 217-218.]

part of his own brigade and at the same time ordered another part under Stand Watie to go to Cabin Creek and to take such position on its south bank as to command the crossing.  It was a time when the rivers were all in flood, a circumstance that greatly affected the outcome since it prevented the forces on the east side of the Grand from coming to Stand Watie’s support.  As Foreman proceeded northward to effect a junction with Williams, he detached some Cherokees from the Third Indian, under Lieutenant Luke F. Parsons, to reconnoitre.  In that way he became apprised of Watie’s whereabouts and enabled to put himself on his guard.  The commissary train, in due time, reached Cabin Creek and, after some slight delay caused, not by Stand Watie’s interposition, but by the high waters, crossed.  Federals and Confederates then collided in a somewhat disjointed but lengthy engagement with the result that Stand Watie retired and the train, nothing the worse for the hold-up, moved on without further molestation to Fort Gibson.[801]

The action at Cabin Creek, July 1 to 3, was the last attempt of any size for the time being to capture Federal supplies en route.  The tables were thenceforth turned and the Confederates compelled to keep a close

[Footnote 801:  In describing what appears to be the action at Cabin Creek, Steele refers to “bad conduct of the Creeks,” and holds it partly responsible for the failure [Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 910].  It is possible that he had in mind, however, a slightly earlier encounter, the same that he described, adversely to D.N.  McIntosh’s abilities as a commander, in his general report [Ibid., part i, 32].  Steele had little faith in the Indian brigade and frankly admitted that he expected it in large measure, to “dissolve,” if the Confederates were to be forced to fall back at Cabin Creek [Steele to Blair, July 1, 1863, Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, 902].  Nevertheless, he anticipated a victory for his arms there [Steele to Blair, July 3, 1863, Ibid., 903].  From his general report, it might be thought that Stand Watie disappointed him at this time, as later; but the Confederate failure was most certainly mainly attributable to the high waters, which prevented the union of their expeditionary forces [Steele to Blair, July 5, 1863, Ibid., 905].]