the wild tribes but he was disgusted with the lack of patriotism and military enthusiasm among the Texans and Arkansans.  Colonel W.P.  Lane’s regiment of Texas Partizan Rangers was another that had to be chided for its dilatoriness [Ibid., pp. 168-169, 199, 234].  Deficient means of transportation was oftentimes the excuse given for failure to appear but Steele’s complaint to Anderson, April 10 [Ibid., 185-186], was very much more to the point.  He wrote,

“...  I find that men are kept back upon every pretext; that QrMasters and Govt Agents or persons calling themselves such have detailed them to drive teams hauling cotton to Mexico, and employed them about the Gov’t agencies.  This cotton speculating mania is thus doing us great injury besides taking away all the transportation in the country....”  Public feeling in Texas was on the side of deserters to a very great extent and in one instance, at least, Steele was forced to defer to it, “You will desist from the attempt to take the deserters from Hart’s Company or any other in northern Texas if the state of public feeling is such that it cannot be done without (cont.)]

within which Colonel Phillips had detected traitors to the Confederate cause,[754] was, perhaps, the most incorrigible.[755] From department headquarters came impassioned appeals[756] for activity and for loyalty but

[Footnote 753:  (cont.) danger of producing a collision with the people.  The men are no doubt deserters, but we have no men to spare, to enforce the arrest at the present time” [Steele to Captain Randolph, July i, 1863, Ibid., p. 116.  See also Steele to Borland, July 1, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, p. 117].  When West’s Battery was ordered to report at Fort Smith it was discovered going in the opposite direction [Steele to J.E.  Harrison, April 25, 1863, Ibid., no. 270, p. 213; Duval to Harrison, May 1, 1863, Ibid., p. 221; Steele to Anderson, May 9, 1863, Ibid., p. 233; Steele to Cooper, May 11 1863, Ibid., pp. 237-238].

One expedition to the plains that Steele distinctly encouraged was that organized by Captain Wells [Steele to Cooper, March 16, 1863, Ibid., pp. 145-146].  It was designed that Wells’s command should operate on the western frontier of Kansas and intercept trains on the Santa Fe trail [Steele to Anderson, April 17, 1863, Ibid., p. 197].]

[Footnote 754:  Official Records, vol. xxii, part ii, p. 62.]

[Footnote 755:  For correspondence with Alexander objecting to further furloughing and urging the need of promptness, see Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 121-122, 163-164, 170, 178-179, 210-211.]

[Footnote 756:  The following are illustrations: 

“...  Every exertion is being made and the Gen’l feels confident that the means will be attained of embarking in an early spring campaign.  It only remains for the officers and men to come forward to duty in a spirit of willingness and cheerfulness to render the result of operations in the Dept (or beyond it as the case may be) not only successful but to add fresh renown to the soldiers whom he has the honor to command ...”—­CROSBY to Talliaferro, February 24, 1863, Confederate Records, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 105-106.