March was then as now the planting season in the Arkansas Valley and, as Phillips rightly argued, if the indigent Indians were not to be completely pauperized, they ought to be given an opportunity to be thrown once more upon their own resources, to be returned home in time to put in crops.  When the high waters subsided and the rivers became fordable, he grew more insistent.  There was grass in the valley of the Arkansas and soon the Confederates would be seizing the stock that it was supporting.  He had held the line of the Arkansas by means of scouts all winter, but scouting would not be adequate much longer.  The Confederates were beginning, in imitation of the Federals, to attach indigents to their cause by means of relief distribution and the “cropping season was wearing on.”

At the end of March, some rather unimportant changes were made by Curtis in the district limits of his department and coincidently Phillips moved over the border.  The first of April his camp was at Park Hill.  His great desire was to seize Fort Smith; for he

realized that not much recruiting could be done among the Choctaws while that post remained in Confederate hands.  Blunt advised caution.  It would not even do to attempt as yet any permanent occupation south of the Arkansas.  Dashes at the enemy might be made, of course, but nothing more; for at any moment those higher up might order a retrograde movement and anyhow no additional support could be counted upon.  Halleck was still calling for men to go to Grant’s assistance and accusing Curtis of keeping too many needlessly in the West.  The Vicksburg campaign was on.

The order that Blunt anticipated finally came and Curtis called for Phillips to return.  La Rue Harrison, foraging in Arkansas,[732] was whining for assistance.  Phillips temporized, having no intention whatsoever of abandoning his appointed goal.  His arguments were unanswerable but Curtis like Halleck could never be made to appreciate the plighted faith that lay back of Indian participation in the war and the strategic importance of Indian Territory.  The northern Indian regiments, pleaded Phillips, were never intended for use in Arkansas.  Why should they go there?  It was doubtful if they could ever be induced to go there again.  They had been recruited to recover the Indian Territory and now that they were within it they were going to stay until the object had been attained.  Phillips solicited Blunt’s backing and got it, to the extent, indeed, that Blunt informed Curtis that if he wanted Indian Territory given up he must order it himself and take the consequences.  It was not given up but Phillips suffered great embarrassments in holding it.  The only support Blunt could render him was to send a negro regiment to Baxter Springs to protect supply

[Footnote 732:  Confederate Military History, vol. x, 166-168.]

trains.  Guerrillas and bushwhackers were everywhere and Phillips’s command was half-starved.  Smallpox[733] broke out and, as the men became more and more emaciated, gained ground.  Phillips continued to make occasional dashes at the enemy and in a few engagements he was more than reasonably successful.  Webber’s Falls was a case in point.