[Footnote 579:  Kile to Dole, July 25, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 580:  Kile to Blunt, September 2, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 581:  Cutler to Coffin, September 30, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 139.]

[Footnote 582:  Coleman to Coffin, September 30, 1862, Ibid., 141.]

[Footnote 583:  Coffin to Mix, August 30, 1862, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862:  same to same, September 13, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 584:  Carruth and Martin to Coffin, September 28, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 167.]

[Footnote 585:  “In replying to the several interrogatorys contained in your letter of the 11th inst, I shall base my answer entirely upon my own (cont.)]

In the contest that ensued between the military and civil authorities or between Blunt and Coffin,[586] Coffin triumphed, although Blunt made no concealment of his

[Footnote 585:  (cont.) observations and experience, obtained during a six months campaign with the Indians, and in the Creek and Cherokee countries.  Taking a deep interest in the welfare of these loyal refugee Indians, who have sacrificed all, rather than fight against our Flag, I shall be cautious and advise no policy but that which will insure their safe restoration to their homes.

“The important question in your letter and that which embodies the whole subject matter is the following—­’Would it be safe in the present condition of the country to restore the southern refugee Indians now in southern Kansas, the women and children, the old, feeble and infirm to their homes in the Indian country?’

“I answer—­It would not be safe to take the women and children to the Creek or Cherokee countries this fall for the following reasons, 1st The corn and vegetable crop north of the Arkansas River will not afford them subsistence for a single month.  The excessive drouth has almost completely destroyed it, and what little would have matured is laid waste by the frequent foraging parties of our own Army, or those of the Rebels.

“The amount of Military force necessary to restore and safely protect this people in their homes would far exceed what is at present at the disposal of the Department of Kansas; and should they be removed to the Indian country, and our forces again be compelled to fall back for the protection of Missouri or Kansas, it would again involve their precipitate flight, or insure their total destruction.

“Again—­the effectiveness of our troops would be materially embarased by the presence of such a vast number of timid and helpless creatures—­I base my judgment upon the following facts—­viz.: