“But,” I objected, “we should only do these things if we thought that kind of short-sighted activity to be good; but, as a matter of fact, we do not, we who object to it.  And that is because, as I hinted before, our idea of even our own Good is that of an activity in and for the Whole, and not merely in and for ourselves.  And, whether it is reasonable or no, we cannot help extending the idea of the Whole, so as to include future generations.  But, as it seems to me, the real meaning and justification of our action is not merely that we are seeking the Good of future generations but that we are endeavouring to realize our own Good, which consists in some such form of activity.  So that really, as was suggested at the beginning, Good will be a kind of activity in ourselves, even though that activity be directed towards ends in which we do not expect to share.”

At this point, Dennis, who had been struggling to speak, broke in at last, in spite of Ellis’s efforts to restrain him.

“Why do you keep saying ’Our Good’?” he cried.  “Why do you not say the Good?  I can’t understand this talk of me and thee, our Good, and their Good, as if there were as many Goods as there are people.”

“Well,” I said, “the distinction, after all, was introduced by Parry, who said that we ought to aim at the Good of a future generation.  Still, I admit that I was getting a little unhappy myself at the kind of language into which I was betrayed.  But what I want to say is this:  So far as it is true at all that it is good to labour for future generations, goodness consists in the activity of so labouring, as much, at least, as in the result produced in those for whose sake the labour is.  That, at least, is the only way in which I can find the position reasonable at all.”

“I don’t see it,” said Parry, and was preparing to re-state his position, when Wilson suddenly intervened with a new train of thought.

“The fact is,” he said, “you have begun altogether at the wrong end.”

“I daresay,” I said, “I can’t find the end; it’s all such a coil.”

“Well,” he said, “this is where I believe the trouble came in.  You started with the idea that the Good must be good for individuals; and that was sure to land you in confusion.”

“What then is your idea?” I asked.

“Why,” he said, “as you might expect from a biologist, I regard everything from the point of view of the species.”

At this I saw Ellis sit up and prepare for an encounter.

“Nature,” continued Wilson, “has always in view the Whole not the Part, the species not the individual.  And this law, which is true of the whole creation, is thrown into special relief in the case of man, because there the interest of the species is embodied in a particular form—­the Society or the State—­and may be clearly envisaged, as a thing apart, towards the maintenance of which conscious efforts may be directed.”