“Well,” he rejoined, “whatever you may say, I still think it right that each generation should sacrifice itself (as you call it) for the next.  And so, I believe, would you, when it came to the point.  At any rate, I have often heard you inveigh against the shortsightedness of modern politicians, and their unwillingness to run great risks and undertake great labours for the future.”

“Quite true,” I said, “that is the view I take.  But I was trying to see how the view could be justified.  For it seems to me, I confess, that we can only be expected to labour for what is, in some sense or other, our own Good; and I do not see how the Good of future generations, in your way of putting it, is also ours.”

“But,” he said, “we have an instinct that it is.”

“I believe we have,” I replied, “but the question would be, what that instinct really means.  Somehow or other, I think it must mean, as you yourself suggested, that our Good is the Good of the Whole.  Only the difficulty is to see how there is a Whole at all.”

“Well,” he said, “perhaps there is no Whole.  What then?”

“Why, then,” I replied, “how can we justify an instinct which bids us labour and sacrifice ourselves for a Good, which, on this hypothesis, has no significance for us, but only for other people.”

“Perhaps,” he said, “we cannot justify it, but I am sure we ought to obey it; and, indeed, I believe we cannot do otherwise.  Even taking the view that the order of the world is altogether unjust, as I admit it would be on the view we are considering, yet, since we cannot remedy the injustice, we are bound at least to make the best of it; and the best we can do is to prepare the Good for those who come after us, even though we can never enter into it ourselves.”

“I am not so sure about that,” Ellis interrupted, “I think the best we can do is to try and realize Good for ourselves—­as much as we can get, even if we admit that this is but little.  For we do at least know, or may hope to discover, what Good for ourselves is; whereas Good for other people is far more hypothetical.”

“But, surely,” he objected, “that would lead to action we cannot approve—­to a sacrifice of all larger Goods to our own pleasure of the moment.  We should breed, for example, without any regard to the future efficacy of the race——­”

“That,” interrupted Ellis, “we do as it is.”

“Yes, but we don’t justify it—­those of us, at least, who think.  And, again, we should squander on immediate gratifications wealth which ought to be stored up against the future.  And so on, and so on; it is not necessary to multiply examples.”