“I would not say that,” I replied, “though I am bound to confess that I see no place for what you call pure Reason.  It is the part of Reason, on my hypothesis, to tabulate and compare results.  She does not determine directly what is good, but works, as in all the sciences, upon given data, recording the determinations not (in this case) of the outer but of the inner sense, noticing what kinds of activity satisfy, and to what degree, the expanding nature of this soul that seeks Good, and deducing therefrom, so far as may be, temporary rules of conduct based upon that unique and central experience which is the root and foundation of the whole.  Temporary rules, I say, because, by the nature of the case, they can have in them nothing absolute and final, inasmuch as they are mere deductions from a process which is always developing and transforming itself.  Systems of morals, maxims of conduct are so many landmarks left to show the route by which the soul is marching; casts, as it were, of her features at various stages of her growth, but never the final record of her perfect countenance.  And that is why the current morality, the positive institutions and laws, on which Parry insisted with so much force, both have and have not the value he assigned to them.  They are in truth invaluable records of experience, and he is rash who attacks them without understanding; and yet, in a sense, they are only to be understood in order to be superseded, because the experience they resume is not final, but partial and incomplete.  Would you agree with that, Parry, or no?”

“I am not sure,” he said.  “It would be a dangerous doctrine to put in practice.”

“Yes,” I said, “but I fear that life itself is a dangerous thing, and nothing we can do will make it safe.  Our only hope is courage and sanity.”

“But,” said Dennis, “to return to the other point, on your view is our knowledge of Good altogether subsequent to experience?”

“Yes,” I replied, “our knowledge is, if you like; but it is a knowledge of experience in Good.  We first recognize Good by what I call direct perception; then we analyze and define what we have recognized; and the results of this process, I suppose, is what we call knowledge, so far as it goes.”

“And there can be no knowledge of Good independent of experience?”

“I do not know; perhaps there might be; only I should like to suggest that even if we could arrive at such a knowledge by pure reason, we should have achieved only a definition of Good, not Good itself; for Good, I suppose you will agree, must be a state of experience, not a formula.”

“Even if it be so,” he said, “it might still be possible to arrive at its formula by pure reason.”

“It may be so,” I replied, “only I console myself with the thought, that if, as is the case with so many of us, we cannot see our way to any such method, we are not left, on my hypothesis, altogether forlorn.  For though we cannot know Good, we can go on realizing Goods, and so making progress towards the ultimate Good, which is the goal not merely of knowledge but of action.”