The Meaning of Good—A Dialogue eBook

Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 239 pages of information about The Meaning of Good—A Dialogue.

The Meaning of Good—A Dialogue eBook

Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 239 pages of information about The Meaning of Good—A Dialogue.

“I hold no doctrine,” interrupted Bartlett; “I merely expressed an opinion, which I am not likely to change for all the philosophy in the world.”  And with that he opened the Chronicle, and presently becoming absorbed, paid for some time no further attention to the course of our debate.

“Well,” I continued, “the doctrine, whether Bartlett holds it or no, that the ultimately good thing is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, cannot be insisted upon as one which appeals at once to everyone’s consciousness as true, so that, in fact, since its enunciation, the controversy about Good may be regarded as closed.  It will hardly be maintained, I imagine, even by Parry, that the truth of the doctrine is a direct and simple intuition, so that it has only to be stated to be accepted?”

“Certainly not,” Parry replied, “the contention of the Utilitarians is that everyone who has the capacity and will take the trouble to reflect will, in fact, arrive at their conclusions.”

“The conclusions being like other conclusions about what is good, the result of a difficult process of analysis, in which there are many possibilities of error, and no more self-evident and simple than any other judgment of the kind?”

He agreed.

“And further, the general principle, tentative and uncertain as it is, requiring itself to be perpetually interpreted anew for every fresh case that turns up.”

“How do you mean?”

“Why,” I said, “even if we grant that the end of action is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, yet we have still to discover wherein that happiness consists.”

“But,” he said, “happiness we define quite simply as pleasure.”

“Yes; but how do we define pleasure?”

“We don’t need to define it.  Pleasure and pain are simply sensations.  If I cut my finger, I feel pain; if I drink when I am thirsty, I feel pleasure.  There can be no mistake about these feelings; they are simple and radical.”

“Undoubtedly.  But if you limit pleasure and pain to such simple cases as these, you will never get out of them a system of Ethics.  And, on the other hand, if you extend the terms indefinitely, they lose at once all their boasted precision, and become as difficult to interpret as Good and Evil.”

“How do you mean?”

“Why,” I said, “if all conduct turned on such simple choices as that between thick soup and clear, then perhaps its rules might be fairly summed up in the utilitarian formula.  But in fact, as everyone knows, the choices are far more difficult; they are between, let us say, a bottle of port and a Beethoven symphony; leisure and liberty now, or L1000 a-year twenty years hence; art and fame at the cost of health, or sound nerves and obscurity; and so on, and so on through all the possible cases, infinitely more complex in reality than I could attempt to indicate here, all of which, no doubt, could be brought under your formula, but none of which the formula would help to solve.”

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The Meaning of Good—A Dialogue from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.