“So do I,” said Parry, “and for my part, I can’t see what you’re all driving at.  You seem to be making a great fuss about nothing.”

“Oh no!” retorted Ellis, “not about nothing! about a really delightful paradox!  We have arrived at the conclusion that we are bound to believe in Good, but that we haven’t the least notion what it is!”

“Exactly!” said Parry, “and that is just what I dispute!”

“What?  That we are bound to believe in Good?”

“No!  But that we don’t know what Good is, or rather, what things are good.”

“Oh!” I cried, “do you really think we do know?  I wish I could think that!  The trouble with me is, that while I seem to see that we are bound to trust our judgments about what is good, yet I cannot see that we know that they are true.  Indeed, from their very diversity, it seems as if they could not all be true.  My only hope is, that perhaps they do all contain some truth, although they may contain falsehood as well.”

“But surely,” said Parry, “you exaggerate the difficulty.  All the confusion seems to me to arise from the assumption that we can’t see what lies under our noses.  I don’t believe, myself, that there is all this difficulty in discovering Good.  Philosophers always assume, as you seem to be doing, that it is all a matter of opinion and reasoning, and that opinions and reasons really determine conduct.  Whereas in fact, I believe, conduct is determined, at least in essentials, by something very much more like instinct.  And it is to this instinct which, by the nature of the case, is simple and infallible, that we ought to look to tell us what is good, and not to our reason, which, as you admit yourself, can only land us in contradictory judgments.  I know, of course, that you have a prejudice against any such view.”

“Not at all!” I said, “if only I could understand it.  I should be glad of any simple and infallible criterion; only I have never yet been able to find one.”

“That, I believe, is because you look for it in the wrong place; or, perhaps, because you look for it instead of simply seeing it.  You will never discover what is good by any process of rational inquiry.  It’s a matter of direct perception, above and beyond all argument.”

“Perhaps it is,” I said, “but surely not of perception, as you said, simple and infallible?”

“If not that, at least sufficiently clear and distinct for all practical purposes.  And to my mind, all discussion about Good is for this reason rather factitious and unreal.  I don’t mean to say, of course, that it isn’t amusing, among ourselves, to pass an hour or two in this kind of talk; but I should think it very unfortunate if the habit of it were to spread among the mass of men.  For inquiry does tend in the long run to influence opinion, and generally to influence it in the wrong way; whereas, if people simply go on following their instinct, they are much more likely to do what is right, than if they try to act on so-called rational grounds.”