“The theme, my dear Parry, is indeed a vast one, and suggests countless developments.  When, for example, we consider (to borrow your own phrase) the reciprocal relations of the householder and the thief, of the murderer and his victim, of the investor and the fraudulent company-promoter; when, turning from these private examples, we cast our eyes on international relations, when we observe the perfect accord of interest between all the great powers in the far East; when we note the smooth harmonious working of that flawless political machine so aptly named the European Concert, each member pursuing its own advantage, yet co-operating without friction to a common end; or when, reverting to the economic sphere, we contemplate the exquisite adjustment that prevails between the mutual interest of labour and capital—­an adjustment broken only now and again by an occasional disturbance, just to show that the centre of gravity is changing; when we observe the World Trust quietly, without a creak or a groan, annihilating the individual producer; or when, to take the sublime example which has already been quoted, we perceive a single individual, in the pursuit of his own Good, positively co-operating with revolutionists on the other side of the globe, and contributing, by the process of starvation, to the deliverance of a great and oppressed people—­if indeed, in such a world as ours, anyone can be said to be oppressed—­when, my dear Parry, we contemplate these things, then—­then—­words fail me!  Finish the sentence as you only can.”

“Oh,” said Parry, good-naturedly enough, “of course I know very well you can make anything ridiculous if you like.  But I still maintain that we must take broad views of these matters, and that the position adopted is substantially correct, if you take long enough periods of time.  Every man in the long run by pursuing his own Good does contribute also to the Good of others.”

“Well,” I said, anxious to keep the argument to the main point, “let us admit for the moment that it is so.  You assert, then, that everyone’s Good is distinct from everyone else’s, and that there is no common Good; but that each one’s pursuit of his own Good is essential to the realization of the Good of all the rest”

“Yes,” he said; “roughly, that is the kind of thing I believe.”

“Well, but,” I continued, “on that system there is at least one thing which we shall have to call a common Good.”

“And what is that?”

“Society itself!  For society is the condition indispensable to all alike for the realization of any individual Good; and a common condition of Good is, I suppose, in a sense, a common Good.”

“Yes,” he replied, “I suppose, in a sense, it is.”

“Well,” I said, “I want no larger admission.  For under ‘society’ what is not included!  Sanction society, and you sanction, or at least you admit the possibility of a sanction for every kind of common activity and end; and the motives of men in undertaking these common activities become a matter of comparative indifference.  Whatever they are consciously aiming at, whether it be their own Good, or the Good of all, or, as is more probable, a varying mixture of both, the fact remains that they do, and we do, admit a common Good, the maintenance and development of society itself.  And that is all I was concerned to get you to agree to.”