his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society, or legislation, constituted by them can never be supposed to extend further than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one’s property by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.  And so, whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws:  and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws; or abroad, to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion.  And all this to be directed to no other end than the peace, safety, and public good of the people."[1]

[Footnote 1:  Locke’s Essay, “Of Civil Government,” Sec. 131.]

Just as in the case of Hobbes, so in that of Locke, it may at first sight appear from this passage that the latter philosopher’s views of the functions of Government incline to the negative, rather than the positive, side.  But a further study of Locke’s writings will at once remove this misconception.  In the famous “Letter concerning Toleration,” Locke says:—­

    “The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men
    constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and
    advancing their own civil interests.

    “Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency
    of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money,
    lands, houses, furniture, and the like.

“It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all the people in general, and to every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of those things belonging to this life.

“...  The whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments....  All civil power, right, and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things.”

Elsewhere in the same “Letter,” Locke lays down the proposition that if the magistrate understand washing a child “to be profitable to the curing or preventing any disease that children are subject unto, and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law, in that case he may order it to be done.”

Locke seems to differ most widely from Hobbes by his strong advocacy of a certain measure of toleration in religious matters.  But the reason why the civil magistrate ought to leave religion alone is, according to Locke, simply this, that “true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind.”  And since “such is the nature of the understanding that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force,” it is absurd to attempt to make men religious by compulsion.