When, therefore, the governor of Rhode Island, by his letter of the 4th of April, 1842, made a requisition upon the Executive for aid to put down the late disturbances, I had no hesitation in recognizing the obligations of the Executive to furnish such aid upon the occurrence of the contingency provided for by the Constitution and laws.  My letter of the 11th of April, in reply to the governor’s letter of the 4th, is herewith communicated, together with all correspondence which passed at a subsequent day and the letters and documents mentioned in the schedule hereunto annexed.  From the correspondence between the Executive of the United States and that of Rhode Island, it will not escape observation that while I regarded it as my duty to announce the principles by which I should govern myself in the contingency of an armed interposition on the part of this Government being necessary to uphold the rights of the State of Rhode Island and to preserve its domestic peace, yet that the strong hope was indulged and expressed that all the difficulties would disappear before an enlightened policy of conciliation and compromise.  In that spirit I addressed to Governor King the letter of the 9th of May, 1842, marked “private and confidential,” and received his reply of the 12th of May of the same year.  The desire of the Executive was from the beginning to bring the dispute to a termination without the interposition of the military power of the United States, and it will continue to be a subject of self-congratulation that this leading object of policy was finally accomplished.  The Executive resisted all entreaties, however urgent, to depart from this line of conduct.  Information from private sources had led the Executive to conclude that little else was designed by Mr. Dorr and his adherents than mere menace with a view to intimidation; nor was this opinion in any degree shaken until the 22d of June, 1842, when it was strongly represented from reliable sources, as will be seen by reference to the documents herewith communicated, that preparations were making by Mr. Dorr, with a large force in arms, to invade the State, which force had been recruited in the neighboring States and had been already preceded by the collection of military stores in considerable quantities at one or two points.  This was a state of things to which the Executive could not be indifferent.  Mr. Dorr speedily afterwards took up his headquarters at Chepachet and assumed the command of what was reported to be a large force, drawn chiefly from voluntary enlistments made in neighboring States.  The Executive could with difficulty bring itself to realize the fact that the citizens of other States should have forgotten their duty to themselves and the Constitution of the United States and have entered into the highly reprehensible and indefensible course of interfering so far in the concerns of a sister State as to have entered into plans of invasion, conquest, and revolution; but the