Besides New Mexico and the Californias, there are other Mexican Provinces which have been reduced to our possession by conquest.  These other Mexican Provinces are now governed by our military and naval commanders under the general authority which is conferred upon a conqueror by the laws of war.  They should continue to be held, as a means of coercing Mexico to accede to just terms of peace.  Civil as well as military officers are required to conduct such a government.  Adequate compensation, to be drawn from contributions levied on the enemy, should be fixed by law for such officers as may be thus employed.  What further provision may become necessary and what final disposition it may be proper to make of them must depend on the future progress of the war and the course which Mexico may think proper hereafter to pursue.

With the views I entertain I can not favor the policy which has been suggested, either to withdraw our Army altogether or to retire to a designated line and simply hold and defend it.  To withdraw our Army altogether from the conquests they have made by deeds of unparalleled bravery, and at the expense of so much blood and treasure, in a just war on our part, and one which, by the act of the enemy, we could not honorably have avoided, would be to degrade the nation in its own estimation and in that of the world.  To retire to a line and simply hold and defend it would not terminate the war.  On the contrary, it would encourage Mexico to persevere and tend to protract it indefinitely.  It is not to be expected that Mexico, after refusing to establish such a line as a permanent boundary when our victorious Army are in possession of her capital and in the heart of her country, would permit us to hold it without resistance.  That she would continue the war, and in the most harassing and annoying forms, there can be no doubt.  A border warfare of the most savage character, extending over a long line, would be unceasingly waged.  It would require a large army to be kept constantly in the field, stationed at posts and garrisons along such a line, to protect and defend it.  The enemy, relieved from the pressure of our arms on his coasts and in the populous parts of the interior, would direct his attention to this line, and, selecting an isolated post for attack, would concentrate his forces upon it.  This would be a condition of affairs which the Mexicans, pursuing their favorite system of guerrilla warfare, would probably prefer to any other.  Were we to assume a defensive attitude on such a line, all the advantages of such a state of war would be on the side of the enemy.  We could levy no contributions upon him, or in any other way make him feel the pressure of the war, but must remain inactive and await his approach, being in constant uncertainty at what point on the line or at what time he might make an assault.  He may assemble and organize an overwhelming force in the interior on his own side of the line, and, concealing his purpose, make a sudden assault upon