four years ago, to wit, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, cast 3,982,011 votes now, against 3,870,222 cast then, showing an aggregate now of 3,982,011.  To this is to be added 33,762 cast now in the new States of Kansas and Nevada, which States did not vote in 1860, thus swelling the aggregate to 4,015,773 and the net increase during the three years and a half of war to 145,551.  A table is appended showing particulars.  To this again should be added the number of all soldiers in the field from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, and California, who by the laws of those States could not vote away from their homes, and which number can not be less than 90,000.  Nor yet is this all.  The number in organized Territories is triple now what it was four years ago, while thousands, white and black, join us as the national arms press back the insurgent lines.  So much is shown, affirmatively and negatively, by the election.  It is not material to inquire how the increase has been produced or to show that it would have been greater but for the war, which is probably true.  The important fact remains demonstrated that we have more men now than we had when the war began; that we are not exhausted nor in process of exhaustion; that we are gaining strength and may if need be maintain the contest indefinitely.  This as to men.  Material resources are now more complete and abundant than ever.

The national resources, then, are unexhausted, and, as we believe, inexhaustible.  The public purpose to reestablish and maintain the national authority is unchanged, and, as we believe, unchangeable.  The manner of continuing the effort remains to choose.  On careful consideration of all the evidence accessible it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any good.  He would accept nothing short of severance of the Union, precisely what we will not and can not give.  His declarations to this effect are explicit and oft repeated.  He does not attempt to deceive us.  He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves.  He can not voluntarily reaccept the Union; we can not voluntarily yield it.  Between him and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible.  It is an issue which can only be tried by war and decided by victory.  If we yield, we are beaten; if the Southern people fail him, he is beaten.  Either way it would be the victory and defeat following war.  What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause is not necessarily true of those who follow.  Although he can not reaccept the Union, they can.  Some of them, we know, already desire peace and reunion.  The number of such may increase.  They can at any moment have peace simply by laying down their arms