[Footnote 27:  Hale of Maine, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Rec., Vol. 33, Pt 1, p. 896.]

It is to be hoped that the Senator’s constituents read this speech in the next morning’s papers, for otherwise it must go down in history as a burst of eloquence wasted upon unhearing ears.  Had he been able to pass his resolution so worded as to “direct” the Secretary of State to throw open the entire files of the Department’s foreign correspondence for the Senate’s inspection, instead of merely “requesting” the President to furnish such information as the Senate desired “if not, in his opinion, incompatible with the public interest,” the result would have been practically the same.  In either event the President would have controlled the situation, since he can not be compelled to furnish information to the Senate when he considers it incompatible with the public interest to do so.  The only power possible to be exercised by the Senate over the Executive in such a case is that of impeachment.  And should impeachment be possible or advisable the process could be carried through as well with the words, “if not, in his opinion, incompatible with the public interest,” out of a resolution as with those words in such a formal request of the Senate.[28]

[Footnote 28:  Teller of Colorado, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Record, Vol. 33, Pt. 1, p. 898.]

As a rule it is unwise for the Senate to interfere while negotiations are pending between the Executive Department and foreign Governments over any question which is at issue.  Should a resolution “requesting” information upon any subject be deemed necessary, it should obviously be addressed to the President and, merely for the sake of courtesy, with the usual caveat.  It should not be “directed” to the Secretary of State, for that official stands in a different relation to the legislative department from that of the secretaries of any of the other departments.  The Secretary of State is not required by law to report to Congress as are all the other Cabinet officers.  He has been exempted from that requirement for the reason that his duties are mainly diplomatic.  Negotiations carried on with foreign Governments upon matters of a delicate character might involve serious embarrassments if during their pendency the successive steps were reported to Congress.[29] The power of the President in consultation with the Secretary of State to deal with foreign Governments at least up to the last moment and final consent of the Senate has made it possible for the United States to preserve a fairly uniform foreign policy.  For despite the repeated changes of administration and of domestic policies the general foreign policy has been closely modeled upon the expedient course of absolute neutrality laid down by Washington.  Were it a practical requirement of the Constitution that all foreign correspondence upon any important question should be at once laid before the Senate, it is reasonable to suppose that few treaties or important conventions would finally be ratified.  In a question of international law such as that under discussion between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, it would have been extremely unwise during the negotiations for the Senate to interfere in any way with the regular course of diplomatic intercourse between the two Governments.