United States should intervene in the interests of peace and use its influence to that end with the British Government."[17] The ambition of the envoys on leaving the Transvaal for Europe had been “for the purpose of seeking recognition and intervention,” but the success of their mission at Washington was not to be greater than it had been in European capitals.  Although Mr. Hay received them courteously their competence to treat directly with the State Department was not recognized.  When they realized this fact they appealed directly to the people in the hope of bringing a certain amount of pressure to bear upon the President from that source.  He fully realized, however, that under the circumstances no interference was advisable.  A departure from this policy would have created a precedent which might later have been appealed to by any European government in behalf of its subjects in this country.  As Presidential candidate, however, William J. Bryan, in effect, if not in express terms, promised a mediation that would mean something should the Democrats come into power, and it was hopes created by such utterances which encouraged the Boers to believe that intervention on the part of the United States was a possibility.  Even the Senate passed resolutions of sympathy which only held out a vain hope and naturally caused a certain amount of criticism in England.  In the end, however, the envoys became convinced that nothing was to be hoped for in the way of dictatorial interference by the United States.

[Footnote 17:  Moore, Digest of Int.  Law, Vol.  I, p. 213]

In his message to Congress, in 1899, three months after the war began, President McKinley had been able to declare:  “This Government has maintained an attitude of neutrality in the unfortunate contest between Great Britain and the Boer States of Africa.  We have remained faithful to the precept of avoiding entangling alliances as to affairs not of our direct concern.  Had circumstances suggested that the parties to the quarrel would have welcomed any kindly expression of the hope of the American people that war might be averted, good offices would have been gladly tendered.”  And in May, 1900, after the interview with the Transvaal delegation, Mr. Hay gave out a statement through his secretary in which it was declared that this entirely correct neutral attitude had been strictly adhered to:  “As the war went on the President, while regretting the suffering and the sacrifices endured by both of the combatants, could do nothing but preserve a strict neutrality between them.  This has been steadfastly and constantly done, but there never has been a moment when he would have neglected any favorable occasion to use his good offices in the interest of peace."[18] Mr. Hay also pointed to the fact that on March 10, 1900, at the request of the Republics, the United States consul at Pretoria had communicated with his Government with a view to the cessation of hostilities, and that the same proposal was made to European powers through their respective consuls.