“(5) Discovered contraband is liable to confiscation; whether with or without compensation depends upon the circumstances of each case.

“(6) If the seizure of the vessel was not justified the belligerent state is bound to order the immediate release of the ship and cargo and to pay full compensation.”

It was the view of the German Government according to these principles, and in view of the recognized practice of nations, that it would not have been possible to lodge a protest against the stopping on the high seas of the three German steamers or to protest against the examination of their papers.  But by the same standard, it was contended that the act of seizing and conveying to Durban the Bundesrath and the Herzog, and the act of discharging the cargoes of the Bundesrath and General, were both undertaken upon insufficiently founded suspicion and did not appear to have been justified.

The end of the discussion between Great Britain and Germany left the somewhat uncertain doctrine of continuous voyages still unsettled.  As applied in 1863 distinctly to a breach of blockade it was generally considered an innovation.  As applied, or attempted to be applied, by Great Britain in 1900 to trade between neutral ports at a time when no blockade existed or was in fact possible, it failed to receive the acquiescence of other nations who were interested.  The discussion, however, rendered, apparent a clear line of cleavage between English practice and Continental opinion.

Mr. Lawrence characterizes as “crude” the doctrine of the German Chancellor, that neutral ships plying between neutral ports are not liable to interference; that, in order for the ship to be legitimately seized, there must be contraband on board, that is, goods bound for a belligerent destination, and that this could not occur where the destination was a neutral port and the point of departure a neutral port.  He declares that if this doctrine were accepted the offense of carrying contraband “might be expunged from the international code;” that “nothing would be easier for neutrals than to supply a belligerent with all he needed for the prosecution of his war."[38] He points out the danger of the acceptance on the part of the Powers of such a doctrine by citing the hypothetical case of France engaged in war, and asserts that under such circumstances even arms and ammunition might be poured into the neutral port of Antwerp and carried by land to the French arsenals.  If Germany should be at war, munitions of war might be run in with practically no hindrance through the neutral harbors of Jutland.  If Italy were at war, Nice or Trieste might be used in the same manner for the Italian Government to secure arms and ammunition.

[Footnote 38:  Principles of Int.  Law, 3d Ed., p. 679.]