The little circle of Germans who have displayed such brilliant organising ability in commerce and industry are practical men, who look at the war and the days to follow the war in the cold light of debit and credit.  This being the case, the honest opinions expressed by Arthur von Gwinner, President of the Deutsche Bank, are worthy of serious consideration.  His chief points were:—­

1.  The belief cherished by the mass of the nation that a Central Europe Economic Alliance will amply compensate us for any shortcomings elsewhere, and enable us to sit back and snap our fingers at the rest of the world is too absurd to be entertained by serious men.  Our trade, import and export, with Austria-Hungary was as great as it could be for many years to come, and it was only a small part of our total trade.  After the war, as before, the bulk of our trade must be with countries now neutral or enemy, and we must seriously consider how to hold and add to this trade in the future.

2.  The solution of the labour problem will be vital in the work of reconstruction.  We must make every provision in order to forge rapidly ahead immediately after the close of the war.

No German, except for necessary reasons of State, should be allowed to leave the country for a number of years after the war.

3.  Before the war 3,000,000 Russians came to us every year at harvest time.  These must continue to come.

4.  We have done wonderful work in scientific agriculture, but the limit of productivity of the soil has undoubtedly been reached.

5.  Do not place too much hope in an early war between the United States and Japan.

6.  There is great rejoicing over the sinking of enemy ships.  It should also be remembered, however, that we are not paying any dividends at present.

In the discussion which followed the statements of Herr von Gwinner and from various channels of reliable information which I made use of in Germany, I found a serious view taken of these and other topics, of which the great body of Germans are quite unaware.

Take the labour problem, for example.  For years Germany has recognised the necessity of a rapid increase of population, if a nation is to smash rivals in industry and war.  Not for a moment during this struggle has Germany lost sight of this fact.  Many times have I heard in the Fatherland that the assurance of milk to children is not entirely for sentimental but also for practical reasons.  Official attempts are being made at present to increase the population in ways which cannot be discussed in this book.  “You get yourself born and the State does all the rest” was an accurate analysis of Germany before the war; but the State looks after everything now.

When men go home on leave from the army, married or single, they are instructed in their duty of doing their part to increase the population so that Germany will have plenty of colonists for the Balkans, Turkey and Asia in the great economic development of those regions.  To impress this they argue that Germany and France had nearly the same number of inhabitants in 1870.  “See the difference to-day,” says the German.  “This difference is one of the chief causes of our greatly superior strength.”