Any German spies who may be working in England to-day have no great difficulty in communicating with Germany, though communication is slow and expensive.  They can do so by many routes and many means.  As it is impossible to isolate Great Britain from Europe, it is equally impossible to prevent the conveyance of information to the enemy with more or less rapidity.  Agents of the various belligerent Powers are plentiful in Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and the United States.  So far as the maritime countries are concerned, ships leave and enter daily.  It is quite impossible to control the movements of neutral sailors and others engaged in these vessels.  To watch all the movements of all those men would require a detective force of impossible dimensions.  That information comes and goes freely by these channels is notorious.  That all the sailors are legitimate sailors I do not believe, and as a matter of fact I know that they are not.

The transmission of documents via Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway has been rendered difficult, but not always impossible.  Cabling and telegraphing have been made very risky.

Judging by the impatience manifested in certain quarters in Berlin at delay in getting news of Zeppelin raids, for example, I believe that the steps taken to delay communication between England and Germany have been effective, and delay in spy work is very often fatal to its efficiency.  The various tentacles of the German spy system, its checks and counter-checks, whereby one spy watches another; whereby the naval spy system has no connection with the military spy system, and the political with neither, greatly mars its utility.

Take one great question—­the question that was all-important to Germany as to whether Great Britain would or would not enter the war in the event of an invasion of Belgium or declaration of war against France.  I was informed on good Berlin authority that from every part of Great Britain and Ireland came different reports.  So far as London was concerned, Prince Lichnowsky said “No.”  Baron von Kuhlmann was non-committal.  As a result Lichnowsky was disgraced and von Kuhlmann continued in favour.

It is common knowledge in Berlin, and may be elsewhere, that the most surprised person in Germany at Great Britain’s action was the Kaiser, whose violent and continual denunciations of Great Britain’s Government, of King Edward, and King George, are repeated from mouth to mouth in official circles with a sameness that indicates accuracy.

All the ignorance of Great Britain’s intentions in 1914 is to me the best proof that the German minute system of working does not always produce the result desired.

As one with Irish blood in my veins, I found that Germany’s Irish spy system (largely conducted by hotel waiters and active for more than five and twenty years) had resulted in hopeless misunderstanding of Irish affairs and Irish character, North and South.