Aguinaldo never himself failed to claim all the prerogatives due to his alleged position as the de facto ruler of the country.  The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communication with him was General Anderson.  He did much to thwart this officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for his troops, and he went so far, in a letter of July 23d (copy herewith marked “J"), as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent—­a notice which, it is hardly necessary to say, was ignored.  The day before the attack on Manila he sent staff officers to the same General, asking for our plans of attack, so that their troops could enter Manila with us.  The same request had previously been made to me by one of his Brigade Commanders, to which I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desired.

Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt on his arrival, and this enabled the latter to avoid any communication with him, either direct or indirect, until after Manila had been taken.  General Merritt then received one of Aguinaldo’s staff officers in his office as Military Governor.  The interview lasted more than an hour.  General Merritt referred to his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American troops had come to Manila and the nature of the Military Government, which would be maintained until further orders from Washington.  He agreed upon the lines outside of the city of Manila, up to which the insurgent troops could come, but no further with arms in their hands.  He asked for possession of the water works, which was given, and, while expressing our friendship and sympathy for the Philippine people, he stated very positively that the United States Government had placed at his disposal an ample force for carrying out his instructions, and even if the services of Aguinaldo’s forces had been needed as allies he should not have felt at liberty to accept them.

The problem of how to deal with Aguinaldo’s Government and troops will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment and difficulty, and will require much tact and skill in its solution.  The United States Government, through its Naval Commander, has, to some extent, made use of them for a distinct military purpose, viz.:  to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops, and for this purpose the Admiral allowed them to take the arms and munitions which he had captured at Cavite, and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other Provinces.  But the Admiral has been very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurances of recognition and no pledges or promises of any description.  The services which Aguinaldo and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila are certainly entitled to consideration, but, after all, they were small in comparison with what was done by our fleet and army.