If Admiral Dewey, after obeying the order of the President to destroy the Spanish fleet at Manila, had steamed away and sought a station to get coal to drive him somewhere else, there would have been no Philippine question on the other side of the world from Washington City.  The Admiral desired to keep open telegraphic communication, and made a proposition to that effect, but the Spanish authorities curtly refused.  Then the cable was cut by order of the Admiral, a section removed, and both ends marked by buoys.  Reflection caused the Spaniards to regret that they had not consented to keep open the cable, that it might be used under restrictions by both belligerents.  They mentioned their change of mind, and were told they were too late.  The American Admiral may have been apprehensive, and he had reason to be, that the Spaniards, knowing they would be crushed in the West Indies if they risked a decisive naval engagement there, might send all their available ships of war to the Philippines, and secure a superiority of force, possibly to destroy their enemies at Manila.  It is clear now that this is what the Spaniards ought to have tried to do.  The Americans were committed to the blockade of Cuba, occupying all the vessels of war they had at hand, and the whole fleet of Spain could have been in the Suez Canal, on the way to Manila when the movement was known to our navy department.  Then Admiral Dewey would, of course, have been warned by way of Hong Kong and a dispatch boat, that he should put to sea and take care of his men and ships.  The result might have been the temporary restoration of the Philippines to Spain.  Our Admiral, six hundred miles from Hongkong, the closest cable connection, could not afford to leave Manila in direct communication with Madrid.  It was for this reason and not that he desired to keep out of way or orders, as some able publicists have kindly promulgated, that the Admiral cut the cable.

The gravest of his responsibilities came upon him after his victory freed the harbor of declared enemies, and placed the great city at his mercy.  If the Spaniards used their big Krupp guns against his ships, he could bombard the city and burn it.  He held the keys to the Philippines, with Manila under his guns, and the question before him then was the same before the country now.  The question that incessantly presses is, whether the Dewey policy is to be confirmed, and the logic of the stay in the harbor, and the dispatch of troops to take the town made good.  We hold the keys of the Philippines.  Shall we continue to do so?  This question transcends in immediate importance—­inevitable consequence—­remote as well as near, all the war with Spain has raised.  So broad a matter should not be rested on narrow grounds, nor decided with haste.  It ought to be scrutinized in all its bearings, and all susceptibilities and material affairs regarded, for it will affect all the people for all time.