In continuation of his explanation that he had to refer matters to others called his counselors, disclaiming the presumption in my questions of his personal responsibility for the conduct of the native insurrection, General Aguinaldo said with the greatest deliberation and the softest emphasis of any of his sayings, that the insurgents were already suspicious of him as one who was too close a friend of the Americans, and yielded too much to them, and that there was danger this feeling might grow and make way with his ability to do all that he would like in the way of keeping the peace.  There were, he said, inquiries to the effect:  What had the insurgents got for what they had done in the capture of Manila?  Were they not treated by the Americans with indifference?

Major Bell interposed to say that the Americans were in the Philippines not as politicians, but as soldiers, and had the duty of preserving order by military occupation, and it was not possible there could be maintained a double military authority—­two generals of equal powers in one city under martial law.  There must be one master and no discussion.  The United States could take no secondary attitude or position—­would treat the insurgents with great consideration, but they of necessity were exclusively responsible for the carrying out of the provisions of the capitulation.

This was exactly to the point, and the interpreter cut his rendering of it, using but few words, and they did not cheer up the General and those about him.  Evidently they want to know when and where they realize.  It had been noticeable that the greater importance Aguinaldo attaches to what he is saying the lower his voice and the more certainly he speaks in a half whisper with parted lips, show-in teeth and tongue; and he has a surprising faculty of talking with the tip of his tongue, extended a very little beyond his lips.  There was something so reserved as to be furtive about his mouth, but his eyes were keen, straight and steady, showing decision, but guarding what he regarded the niceties of statement.  However, his meaning that there were insurgents who were finding fault with him was not so much indicative of a rugged issue as a confession of impending inabilities.

He had nothing to say in response to Major Bell’s explicit remark about the one-man and one-country military power, but the action of the insurgents in removing their headquarters—­or their capital, as they call it—­to a point forty miles from Manila, proves that they have come to an understanding that the soldiers of the United States are not in the Philippines for their health entirely, or purely in the interest of universal benevolence.  The Filipinos must know, too, that they could never themselves have captured Manila.  It is not inapt to say that the real center of the rebellion against Spain is, as it has been for years, at Hongkong.