My first point in talking with Aguinaldo was that the people of the Philippines ought to be strongly represented in Paris, and of the reasons briefly presented, the foremost was that they sought independence, and should be heard before the commission by which their fate would be declared for the present, so far as it could be, by a tribunal whose work was subject to revision.  The general’s information was that the Paris conference would be opened September 15, an error of a fortnight, and his impression was that the terms regarding the Philippines would be speedily settled, so that there could not be time to send to Paris, but there had been a determination reached to have a man in Washington.

It is to be taken into account that this interview was before anything had been made known as to the mission which General Merritt undertook, and that in a few days he set forth to perform, and that the terms of the protocol had not been entirely published in Manila.  I told the general it was not possible that the Philippine problem could speedily be solved, and made known to him that the transport China, which holds the record of quick passage on the Pacific, was to sail for San Francisco in three days, and he would do well to have his men for Washington and Paris go on her if permission could be obtained, as there was no doubt it could, and I mentioned the time required to reach Washington and Paris—­that one could be on a trans-Atlantic steamer in New York six hours after leaving Washington, that the Philippine commissioners going to Paris should make it a point to see the President on the way, and the whole matter one of urgency, but it was certainly not too late to act.

The General said it had been thought a representative of the islands and of the cause of the people should go to Washington, but the man was in Hongkong.  He could, however, be telegraphed, so that he could catch the China at Nagasaka, Japan, where she would have to stop two days to take coal.  The Washington commissioner might go to Paris, but instructions could not reach him before he left Hongkong, as it would not be desirable to telegraph them.  Upon this I stated if it suited his convenience and he would send instructions by me, I was going on the China, and would charge myself with the special confidential care of his dispatches and deliver them to the commissioner at the coaling station, when he should join the ship; and if it was the desire of the General to have it done I would telegraph the President that Philippine commissioners were on the way.  These suggestions were received as if they were agreeable, and esteemed of value.

The conversation turned at this point to the main question of the future government of the Philippines, and I inquired what would be satisfactory to the General, and got, of course, the answer, “Philippine independence.”  But I said after the United States had sent a fleet and destroyed the Spanish fleet and an army in full possession of Manila she was a power that could not be ignored; and what would be thought of her assuming the prerogative of Protector?  She could not escape responsibility.  His views as to the exact line of demarkation or distinction between the rights of the United States and those of the people of the islands should be perfectly clear, for otherwise there would be confusion and possibly contention in greater matters than now caused friction.