“But why didn’t you obey orders and close in on the mouth of the harbor instead of heading out to sea?” inquired Evans.

Commodore Schley’s reply was that he was afraid the Vizcaya would ram the Brooklyn.  This colloquy referred to a striking maneuver of the flagship Brooklyn early in the engagement at Santiago, which has been commented on before.  In justice to Commodore Schley the navy department officers admit the Spanish officers after the battle said that it had been their purpose, on emerging from the harbor, to have the Vizcaya ram the Brooklyn, believing that the Spanish cruisers could outrun the remaining vessels in the American fleet, most of which were battleships, supposed to be of a lower rate of speed than the Spanish cruisers.

The action of the Vizcaya as she headed toward the Brooklyn indicated her determination to carry out this programme.  But the remark of Captain Evans to the nominal commander of the squadron would under ordinary circumstances have been an act of insubordination and only illustrates the feeling of some of the captains of the fleet toward the Commodore.

It has been said that Schley, being ordered to Key West when Cervera appeared in Cuban waters, “proceeded to Cienfuegos, which was thought to be the destination of the Spanish warships.  That port commanded the only direct railroad connection with Havana, and had the Spanish fleet gone there Admiral Cervera could have relieved General Blanco with money and munitions of war and received in return supplies necessary for his squadron.  It is believed even now that had the Spanish ships been properly supplied and equipped they would have gone to Cienfuegos instead of to Santiago.  But subsequent developments have shown that Admiral Cervera was permitted to take only enough coal to carry him to the nearest port, Santiago.”

Schley credited Cervera with knowing enough to know that Cienfuegos was the better port for his purposes, and therefore adhered to his opinion, and Sampson was made his superior officer.  So important have the differences seemed that the Wainwright Board was convened to investigate the parts taken in the Santiago naval battle respectively by Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley.  But in official phrase this board was convened for the purpose of determining the position and courses of the ships engaged in the action at Santiago July 3, and reporting to the Secretary of the Navy.

The report is: 

“U.S.F.S.  New York, First Rate, Navy Yard, New York, Oct. 8, 1898.—­Sir:  In obedience to your order of Sept. 2, 1898, appointing us a board to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera’s squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, off Santiago de Cuba, we have the honor to submit the following report, accompanied by a chart, showing the positions of the ships at seven different times.

“These times, as taken by the United States ships engaged, with the incidents noted, are as follows: