“An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, but I must say in addition to what he told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward.  They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago.  Our trouble from the first has been the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of attempting to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

“It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

“If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance I will at once prepare to undertake it.  I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

“We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use I will enter the harbor.

“This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

“It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port.”

The Admiral says he began making preparations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon the batteries at the entrance a visit was arranged to General Shafter, so that the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action take place.

He adds:  “I had in view the employment of the marines for an assault an either the Morro or Socapa battery, while at the same time assaulting the defenses at the entrance with the fleet.”

The Admiral says of the sortie and destruction of Cervera’s fleet: 

“This event closes the purely naval campaign, crowning with complete success the anxious work of almost exactly two months.”

The error of Commodore Schley as to the location of Cervera’s fleet, his hesitation in accepting the report of the Spaniards’ presence at Santiago, appears to have caused the advancement of Admiral Sampson and subordinated Schley.  Out of this came differences of opinion about facts among the close friends of the two distinguished officers.  Schley was close at hand when Cervera’s run from Santiago took place, while Sampson was out of the way on other duty, and Schley has been charged with an evasive movement of the New York just then that lost valuable time.  It is related by the Washington staff correspondent of the Chicago Times-Herald that just after the battle of Santiago, Commodore Schley went aboard the Iowa and hailed Captain Evans with the remark that it had been a great day for the American navy.