According to a dispatch to Secretary Long, dated June 26, the channel at Santiago not having been obstructed by the sinking of the Merrimac, Admiral Sampson was preparing a torpedo attack to hasten the destruction of the Spanish vessels, although he regretted resorting to this method because of its difficulties and small chance of success.  He would not do this, he says, were the present force to be kept there; as it then insured a capture, which he believed would terminate the war.

There was contemplated at this time sending a fleet to the Spanish coast; and this expedition was to consist of the Iowa, Oregon, Newark, Yosemite, Yankee, and Dixie, and they were to go to the Azores for orders, en route to Tangier, Morocco.  The colliers were to join the fleet at the Azores.

On June 30 the Admiral received a communication from Major-General Shafter announcing that he expected to attack Santiago the following morning, and asking that he (Sampson) bombard the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry, and make such demonstrations as he thought proper at the harbor’s mouth, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible.

This request was complied with, and on July 1 General Shafter asked that the Admiral keep up his fight on the Santiago water front.  On July 2 the following was received from General Shafter.

“Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched about three-fourths of a mile from town.  I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already heavy.  You can now operate with less loss of life than I can.  Please telephone answer.”

A reply was telephoned General Shafter from Admiral Sampson, through Lieutenant Stanton, which said the Admiral had bombarded the forts at the entrance of Santiago and also Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire, and asked whether he (Shafter) wanted further firing on the Admiral’s part.  The explanation was made that it was impossible to force an entrance until the channel was cleared of mines—­a work of some time after the forts were taken possession of by the troops.  To this General Shafter replied: 

“It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance of harbor.  If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against it will be some time and at great loss of life.  I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army.  My loss yesterday was over 500 men.  By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished.  I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men to capture the forts along the bay.”

On the 2nd of July, Sampson wrote to Shafter.