Shortly after news was received that the Spanish fleet had appeared off Curacao, West Indies, and the squadron under orders from the department proceeded to Key West, to which place the flying squadron under Commodore (now Admiral) Schley had already been ordered.

Arrangements were then hurriedly made and the flying squadron, augmented by the other vessels under Commodore Schley, was sent off Cienfuegos, where it was believed the enemy would go, in which case an effort was to be made to engage and capture him.  Sampson was given the choice either of the command of the blockading squadron off Havana or at Cienfuegos, Schley in either case to remain with his own squadron.

From messages received by the Admiral from the department about May 20 it appears that reports had reached the United States that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, so the department advised Sampson to send immediately word to Schley to proceed to that place, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos.

On May 21 instructions were written by Samnson for Commodore Schley and sent to him via the Marblehead regarding the possibility of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago.  They are in part as follows: 

United States Flagship New York, First Rate, Key West, Fla., May 21.—­Sir:  Spanish squadron is probably at Santiago de Cuba—­four ships and three torpedo boat destroyers.  If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port.  You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants—­fishermen or others—­to learn definitely that the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside.

The Admiral said he felt much concerned as to the delivery of these orders and sent a duplicate by the Hawk with an additional memorandum.  The Admiral suggested that if the information did not reach Commodore Schley before daylight of May 23 to mask the real direction he should take as much as possible.  He adds:  “Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take.”

The Admiral off Havana gives copies of orders of battle which were to be followed in the event that Cervera left Santiago on the approach of Schley’s fleet from Cienfuegos and attempted to cruise around the coast to Havana, in which case the Havana squadron would attempt to intercept him by going east about 200 miles beyond the junction of Santiren and Nicholas Channels.  Strict orders were given for screening lights and to see that none were accidentally shown.

The squadron was to cruise generally to the eastward in the day and westward during the night.

On May 23, as shown by the report, Commodore Schley expressed the belief that the Spaniards were at Cienfuegos.  On the 27th the Admiral sent word to Schley, directing him to proceed with all possible speed to Santiago because of information received that the Spaniards were there.  The same time orders were sent to have the collier Sterling dispatched to Santiago with an expression of opinion that the Commodore should use it to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into the harbor.