Admiral Sampson’s report, dated August 3d, was published October 23d, and covers the conduct of the fleet under his command, in its operations in the West Indies, for about two months prior to the destruction of Admiral Cervera’s ships on July 3.  It was made up largely of official dispatches and the movements of the fleet, with explanations and comment by the Admiral, and begins with a statement of the determination reached by the Navy department to send a squadron to the Windward Passage for the purpose of observation, because of the information received of the sailing, on April 29, of Admiral Cervera’s squadron from the Cape Verde Islands.

On the voyage eastward from the naval base at Key West, which began on May 4, Admiral Sampson reports there was experienced endless trouble and delay because of the inefficiency of the two monitors accompanying the other ships, and which had to be taken in tow.  Their coal supply was so small that it was at once evident that they must either frequently coal or be towed.  The Admiral says: 

“Had the sea been rough, or had the enemy appeared at this juncture, the squadron would have been in a much better position for an engagement had the monitors been elsewhere.  Subsequently, when engaging the batteries of San Juan, it was evident that their shooting was bad.

“Owing to the quick rolling of these vessels, even in a moderate sea, they were unable to fire with any degree of accuracy.”

Among the telegrams received by the Admiral from the department at Washington when off Cape Haytien was the following: 

Washington, D.C., May 6.—­Do not risk or cripple your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from soon afterwards successfully fighting Spanish fleet, composed of Pelayo, Carlos V., Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four deep sea torpedo boats, if they should appear on this side. Long.

It was determined to go to Porto Rico, and the squadron arrived off San Juan on the morning of the 12th and the bombardment of that place ensued.  Regarding his action at this place the Admiral says: 

“It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the flying squadron was still north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera’s natural objective, was thus open to entry by such force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate movement toward Havana imperative.

“I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood westward for Havana.”

Several telegrams are here presented, based on reports that Cervera’s squadron had returned to Cadiz and they had in view “to return and capture San Juan, the desire to do so and occupy the place being assured in the event of Admiral Cervera’s failure to cross the Atlantic.”