“Two days after this I saw General Toral, and I was convinced from conversation with him that he was going to surrender. I had no one but myself to take the responsibility, in fact, I did not want anyone else to do it, but while I was convinced myself it was hard to convince others. I knew that we could capture the town at any time, that we had it surrounded so that they could not possibly get away, although on the night of July 2 2,800 men marched in. I had understood there were 8,000, but when we counted them a few days afterward there were only 2,800. I knew that if we carried that town by force a thousand men at least would be lost to the American army, and a thousand good American men are a good many to expend in capturing a Spanish town (applause), and I did not propose to do it if I could possibly talk them out of it.
“General Toral knew just as well as I did that I knew just what he had—that he was on his last rations, and that nothing but plain rice, that we had his retreat cut off, that we had the town surrounded, that he could not hurt us, while we could bombard him and do some little damage, perhaps, and that it was only a question of a few days.
“I found out a few days later what the hitch was which caused the delay, for General Toral had told me that he had been authorized by Blanco, the Governor-General, to enter into negotiations and make terms for surrender, and in Cuba you know General Blanco was in supreme command. His authority was such that he could even set aside a law of Spain. Knowing that, I felt sure that after very little delay they would surrender. They desired to get permission from the Madrid government to return to Spain. It was that that delayed them. Immediately upon receiving the permission to return to Spain they surrendered.
“I had in line when the fighting was going on, about 13,000 men—not more than that at any time. Inside the Spanish trenches there were about 10,000. There were 11,500 surrendered, and I think about 1,500 of them were sick. The disproportion, considering the difference of situation, is not very great. In fact, I think that 10,000 American soldiers could have kept 100,000 Spaniards out had they been in the same position (applause), although I do not wish to disparage the bravery of the Spanish troops. They are gallant fellows, but they have not the intelligence and do not take the initiative as do the American soldiers; and they have not the bull-dog pluck that hangs on day after day.
“Toral made the first proposition to surrender. He said if I would let him take his men and such things as they could carry on their persons and on a few pack mules that they had and guarantee him safe conduct to Holguin, which was fifty-two miles away to the north and in the interior, they would march out. I told him, of course, that was out of the question; that I could not accept any such terms as that, but I would submit it to the President. I did so,