General Hawkins, after General Kent reached the crest, “reported that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider incorrect.  Credit is almost equally due the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-fourth regiments of infantry.  Owing to General Hawkins’ representations, I forwarded the report sent to corps headquarters about 3 p.m. that the Sixth and Sixteenth infantry regiments captured the hill.  The Thirteenth Infantry captured the enemy’s colors waving over the fort, but, unfortunately, destroyed them, distributing the fragments among the men, because, as was asserted, ‘It was a bad omen,’ two or three men having been shot while assisting private Arthur Agnew, Company H, Thirteenth Infantry, the captor.  All fragments which could be recovered are submitted with this report.

“I have already mentioned the circumstances of my Third Brigade’s advance across the ford, where in the brief space of ten minutes it lost its brave commander (killed) and the next two ranking officers by disabling wounds.  Yet, in spite of these confusing conditions the formations were effected without hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting singly in some instances, and by battalion and regiments in others, rushing through the jungle, across the stream waist deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed wire.”

General Kent says: 

“The bloody fighting of my brave command can not be adequately described in words.  The following list of killed, wounded, and missing tells the story of their valor: 

“July 1st the loss was 12 officers and 77 men killed, 32 officers and 463 men wounded, 58 men missing.  Total loss, 642.”

The following day the Spaniards resumed the battle, and the losses of Kent’s command on the 2nd and 3d of July made up a total loss in three days of 99 killed and 597 wounded, and 62 missing.  General Shafter said that before closing his report he desired to dwell upon “the natural obstacles I had to encounter, and which no foresight could have overcome or obviated.  The rocky and precipitous coast afforded no sheltered landing places, the roads were mere bridle paths, the effect of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated troops was deadly, and a dread of strange and unknown diseases had its effect on the army.

“The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the command had to be depended upon for the victualing of my army, as well as the 20,000 refugees, who could not in the interests of humanity be left to starve while we had rations.”

During the Chicago Peace Jubilee, General Shafter made an address at the Armory of the First Illinois Volunteers, and, released from the continual forms of official reports, added much of interest to the story of Santiago.  He says of the send-off: 

“We were twice embarked and twice taken back to Tampa and disembarked.  On the first occasion the cause was the appearance of Admiral Cervera’s fleet; it requiring the entire navy that was disposable to go after that fleet, and the second time by a report that afterwards turned out to be incorrect, that in the St. Nicholas channel, through which we would have to go, some Spanish cruisers had been seen.”