“To approach Santiago from the east over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter, was, in my judgment, the only feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment.”

The disembarkation commenced June 22nd, and all men were ordered to carry “on the person the blanket roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days’ field rations (with coffee, ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man.  Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company,”

Two days were occupied in getting the troops ashore, and the first engagement was on the morning of the 24th, General Young’s brigade taking the advance, and finding a Spanish force strongly intrenched on the Santiago road three miles from Siboney.  Young’s force was 964 officers and men.  The enemy were driven from the field.  Our loss, 1 officer and 15 men killed, and 6 officers and 46 men wounded.  Spanish loss reported 9 killed and 27 wounded.  General Shafter says the engagement had “an inspiring effect” upon the men, and “gave us a well-watered country further to the front, on which to encamp our troops,” and the rest of the month was occupied in attempting to land rations enough to have a reserve, and “it was not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on shore three days’ supplies in excess of those required for the daily consumption.”

General Shafter reconnoitered, and formed his plan of battle June 30th, and reports that in the opening of the engagement on July 1st “the artillery fire from El Pozo was soon returned by the enemy’s artillery.  They evidently had the range of this hill, and their first shells killed and wounded several men.  As the Spaniards used smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the position of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.”

The advantages the Spaniards had in the use of smokeless powder were conspicuous throughout the scenes of fighting both at Santiago and Manila.  We had, however, at Santiago a war balloon of the actual service, of which General Shafter says:  “General Kent forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream.  A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war balloon.  This information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left.”