“Owing to the heavy storm and high surf it was impossible to communicate promptly with the division commander at Cavite, and I received my instructions direct from the major-general commanding, or his staff officers, one of whom visited my camp every day, and I reported direct to him in the same manner.  My instructions were to occupy the insurgent trenches near the beach, so as to be in a good position to advance on Manila when ordered, but meanwhile to avoid precipitating an engagement, not to waste ammunition, and (after August 1) not to return the enemy’s fire unless convinced that he had left his trenches and was making an attack in force.  These instructions were given daily in the most positive terms to the officer commanding in the trenches, and in the main they were faithfully carried out.

“More ammunition than necessary was expended on the nights of August 2 and 5, but in both cases the trenches were occupied by troops under fire for the first time, and in the darkness and rain there was ground to believe that the heavy fire indicated a real attack from outside the enemy’s trenches.  The total expenditure of ammunition on our side in the four engagements was about 150,000 rounds, and by the enemy very much more.

“After the attack of July 31-August I, I communicated by signal with the captain of the U. S. S. Raleigh, anchored about 3,000 yards southwest of my camp, asking if he had received orders in regard to the action of his ship in case of another attack on my troops.  He replied: 

“Both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt desire to avoid general action at present.  If attack too strong for you, we will assist you, and another vessel will come and offer help.  “In repeating this message, Lieutenant Tappan, commanding U. S. S. Callao, anchored nearer the beach, sent me a box of blue lights, and it was agreed that if I burned one of these on the beach the Raleigh would at once open fire on the Spanish fort.”

General Merritt speaks of the Colorado skirmishers leaving their breastworks when the navy ceased firing on the 13th of August, and advancing swiftly, finding the Spanish trenches deserted, “but as they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line, situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own.”

General Greene is complimentary to the officers and who conducted the reconnaissances while he was at Camp Dewey twenty-five days, and states: