When the House met at the beginning of the next year they felt that they had been deceived; they were still more indignant when Roon informed them that he had discovered that the whole of the reorganisation could be legally carried through in virtue of the prerogative of the Crown, and that a fresh law was not required; that therefore the consideration of the changes was not before the House, and that all they would have to do would be to vote the money to pay for them.  Of course the House refused to vote the money; after long debates the final settlement of the question was postponed for another year; the House, though this time by a majority of only eleven votes, granting with a few modifications the required money, but again for one year only.

All this time Bismarck was living quietly at St. Petersburg; he had no influence on affairs, for the military law had nothing to do with him, and the Regent did not consult him on foreign policy.  No one, however, profited by Roon’s appointment so much as he; he had once more a friend and supporter at Court, who replaced the loss of Gerlach.  Roon and he had known one another in the old Pomeranian days.  There was a link in Moritz Blankenburg, who was a “Dutz” friend of Bismarck’s and Roon’s cousin.  We can understand how untenable Roon’s position was when we find the Minister of War choosing as his political confidants two of the leaders of the party opposed to the Ministry to which he belonged.

Ever since Roon had entered the Government there had been indeed a perpetual crisis.

The Liberal Ministers were lukewarm in their support of the military bill; they only consented to adopt it on condition that the King would give his assent to those measures which they proposed to introduce, in order to maintain their positions as leaders of the party; they proposed to bring in bills for the reform of the House of Lords, for the responsibility of Ministers, for local government.  These were opposed to the personal opinions of the King; he was supported in his opposition by Roon and refused his assent, but he neither dismissed the Ministers nor did they resign.  So long as they were willing to hold office on the terms he required, there was indeed no reason why he should dismiss them; to do so would be to give up the last hope of getting the military Bill passed.  All through 1861 the same uncertainty continued; Roon indeed again and again wrote to his master, pointing out the necessity for getting rid of his colleagues; he wished for a Conservative Ministry with Bismarck as President.  Here, he thought, was the only man who had the courage to carry through the army reform.  Others thought as he did.  Who so fitted to come to the help of the Crown as this man who, ten years before, had shewn such ability in Parliamentary debate?  And whenever the crisis became more acute, all the Quidnuncs of Berlin shook their heads and said, “Now we shall have a Bismarck Ministry, and that will be a coup d’etat and the overthrow of the Constitution.”