“The disease to which our Parliamentary life has succumbed, is, besides the incapacity of the individual, the servility of the Lower House.  The majority has no independent convictions, it is the tool of ministerial omnipotence.  If our Chambers do not succeed in binding the public interest to themselves and drawing the attention of the country, they will sooner or later go to their grave without sympathy.”

Curious it is to see how his opinion as to the duties and relations of the House towards the Government were to alter when he himself became Minister.  He regarded it as an advantage that the Ministry would have the power which comes from popularity; his only fear was that they might draw the Regent too much to the left; but he hoped that in German and foreign affairs they would act with more decision, that the Prince would be free from the scruples which had so much influenced his brother, and that he would not fear to rely on the military strength of Prussia.

One of their first acts was to recall Bismarck from Frankfort; the change was inevitable, and he had foreseen it.  The new Government naturally wished to be able to start clear in their relations to Austria; the Prince Regent did not wish to commit himself from the beginning to a policy of hostility.  It was, however, impossible for a cordial co-operation between the two States to be established in German affairs so long as Bismarck remained at Frankfort; the opinions which he had formed during the last eight years were too well known.  It was, moreover, evident that a crisis in the relations with Austria was approaching; war between France and Austria was imminent; a new factor and a new man had appeared in Europe,—­Piedmont and Cavour.

In August, 1858, Cavour had had a secret and decisive interview with Napoleon at Plombieres; the two statesmen had come to an agreement by which France engaged to help the Piedmontese to expel the Austrians from Italy.  Bismarck would have desired to seize this opportunity, and use the embarrassment of Austria as the occasion for taking a stronger position in Germany; if it were necessary he was prepared to go as far as an alliance with France.  He was influenced not so much by sympathy with Piedmont, for, as we have seen, he held that those who were responsible for foreign policy should never give way to sympathy, but by the simple calculation that Austria was the common enemy of Prussia and Piedmont, and where there were common interests an alliance might be formed.  The Government were, however, not prepared to adopt this policy.  It might have been supposed that a Liberal Ministry would have shewn more sympathy with the Italian aspirations than the Conservatives whom they had succeeded.  This was not the case, as Cavour himself soon found out.