He found Berlin divided into two parties:  the one looked to the Czar as their patron and protector, the other wished to win the approval of England; he missed a reasonable conviction as to what was the interest of Prussia.  His own advice was against alliance with the Western Powers or Austria; better join Russia than England; better still, preserve neutrality and hold the balance of Europe.  He had the reputation of being very Russian, but he protested against the term.  “I am not Russian,” he said, “but Prussian.”  He spoke with great decision against the personal adherents of the King, men who looked to the Czar rather than to their own sovereign, and carried their subservience even to treason.  As in former days, courage he preached and resolution.  Some talked of the danger of isolation; “With 400,000 men we cannot be isolated,” he said.  The French envoy warned him that his policy might lead to another Jena; “Why not to Waterloo?” he answered.  Others talked of the danger of an English blockade of their coasts; he pointed out that this would injure England more than Prussia.

“Let us be bold and depend on our own strength; let us frighten Austria by threatening an alliance with Russia, frighten Russia by letting her think we may join the Western Powers; if it were true that we could never side with Russia, at least we must retain the possibility of threatening to do so.”

The result was what we might expect from the character of the King; unable to decide for either of the contending factors, he alternated between the two, and gave his support now to one, now to the other.  In March, when Bismarck was still in Berlin, sudden disgrace fell upon the English party; Bunsen was recalled from London, Bonin, their chief advocate in the Ministry, was dismissed; when the Prince of Prussia, the chief patron of the Western alliance, protested, he was included in the act of disfavour, and had to leave Berlin, threatened with the loss of his offices and even with arrest.  All danger of war with Russia seemed to have passed; Bismarck returned content to Frankfort.  Scarcely had he gone when the old affection for Austria gained the upper hand, and by a separate treaty Prussia bound herself to support the Austrian demands, if necessary by arms.  Bismarck heard nothing of the treaty till it was completed; the Ministers had purposely refrained from asking his advice on a policy which they knew he would disapprove.  He overcame his feelings of disgust so far as to send a cold letter of congratulation to Manteuffel; to Gerlach he wrote: 

“His Majesty should really see to it that his Ministers should drink more champagne; none of the gentry ought to enter his Council without half a bottle under his belt.  Our policy would soon get a respectable colour.”

The real weakness lay, as he well knew, in the character of the King.  “If here I say to one of my colleagues, ’We remain firm even if Austria drives matters to a breach,’ he laughs in my face and says, ’As long as the King lives it will not come to a war between Austria and Prussia.’” And again, “The King has as much leniency for the sins of Austria as I hope to have from the Lord in Heaven.”